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INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act 
(“VAWA”).1  Six years later, Congress reauthorized VAWA2 in part to 
“address[] residual immigration law obstacles standing in the path of 
battered immigrant spouses and children seeking to free themselves from 
abusive relationships . . . .”3  Over the last ten years, VAWA’s provisions 
have enabled over 20,000 battered immigrants to gain secure immigration 
status in the United States.4  Nevertheless, this Comment argues that the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) has 
frustrated VAWA’s success by failing to administer VAWA remedies for 
                                                          
 1. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1902, Title IV (1994) [hereinafter VAWA I] (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. 
and 204 I.N.A.).  The Act attempts to provide cohesive federal solutions to address the 
problem of domestic violence. 
 2. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, 114 Stat. 1464, Division B (2000) [hereinafter VAWA II] (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 204 I.N.A.).  This section extends funding for VAWA I 
programs and addresses gaps in protection for certain victims of domestic violence. 
 3. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,195 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (recognizing the need to 
prevent abusers from using immigration law to prevent battered immigrant women from 
leaving them). 
 4. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, PROTECTING IMMIGRANT SURVIVORS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND OTHER CRIMES, at http://www.national 
immigrationproject.org/Factsheet%20Immigrant%20Survivors.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 
2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (detailing numbers of VAWA 
claims). 
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limited English proficient (“LEP”) immigrant individuals, particularly 
women,5 in accordance with the Constitution, civil rights proclamations, 
and congressional intent.6 
The United States admits hundreds of thousands of immigrant spouses 
every year,7 and a significant number of them will become victims of 
domestic violence at the hands of their U.S. citizen (“USC”) or legal 
permanent resident (“LPR”) spouses.8  The USCIS, formerly known as the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), has a legal obligation to 
provide linguistically appropriate services that enable LEP women to 
access VAWA remedies.9  This responsibility arises under Executive Order 
13,166,10 which extended to federal agencies the obligations of Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”), prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of national origin.11  The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, 
which prevents the arbitrary denial of liberty interests,12  and the Equal 
                                                          
 5. VAWA also applies to male spouses.  See 146 CONG. REC. S10,193 (daily ed. Oct. 
11, 2000) (emphasizing VAWA’s gender-neutral language).  Nevertheless, this Comment 
focuses on battered immigrant women because the discriminatory administration of VAWA 
benefits impacts immigrant women more severely because of two important facts.  First, 
legally-admitted spouses are mostly female.  See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 
LEGAL IMMIGRATION:  SETTING PRIORITIES 51 (1995) (specifying that women made up sixty 
percent of USC spouses immigrating to the United States for fiscal year 1994).  In 1994, 
two-thirds of LPR spouses were female.  Id. at 64.  There is also significant statistical 
prevalence of male violence against women compared to female violence against men.  See 
NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, NATIONAL STATISTICS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
INFORMATION,  at http://www. ndvh.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (on file with the 
American University Law Review) [hereinafter NDVH STATISTICS] (quoting Department of 
Justice statistic that in ninety-two percent of domestic violence incidents, men commit 
crimes against women). 
 6. See infra Parts II-III (arguing that USCIS’s administration of VAWA violates due 
process, Executive Order 13,166, and congressional intent). 
 7. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS, at 20 tbl.4 (2002) (noting that the United States admitted 294,798 immigrant 
spouses of U.S. citizens in 2002), available at http://uscis.gov/ 
graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/immigs.htm; id. at 21 tbl.5 (indicating that the United 
States admitted 28,874 immigrant spouses of legal permanent residents in 2002). 
 8. See Mary Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources 
and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas:  Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. 
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245, 250 (2000) (reporting that thirty-four percent of immigrant 
Latinas experience domestic violence in a study conducted by the Immigrant Women’s Task 
Force of the Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights and Service). 
 9. See infra Parts II-III (addressing USCIS’s obligations under the Fifth Amendment 
and Executive Order 13,166). 
 10. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (clarifying that Title VI required 
federally-funded agencies to provide LEP accommodations and extending such obligations 
to federally-conducted agencies as well). 
 11. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, §§ 601-602 (1964) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d) (prohibiting recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating 
on the basis of race, color, and national origin when providing services and authorizing 
federal agencies to establish regulations to achieve these objectives); see also Lau v. 
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (affirming the prohibition of language discrimination as a 
form of national origin discrimination under Title VI). 
 12. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law”). 
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Protection Clause, which provides equal protection for similarly-situated 
individuals, fortify this responsibility.13 
In order to create programs that enable battered immigrant women14 to 
be safe from abuse, it is important to recognize barriers that operate within 
cultures to impede women’s access to available immigration remedies,15 in 
addition to accessibility barriers shared by all battered women.16  However, 
even culturally-appropriate strategies may fail to reach LEP battered 
immigrant women because of institutional barriers that systematically 
exclude them from access to services.17  By adopting the perspective of an 
LEP battered immigrant woman,18 this Comment attempts to expose the 
                                                          
 13. See id. amend. XIV (barring a state from denying “any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”); id. amend. V (providing for due process to prevent 
arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 
(1954) (extending equal protection guarantees to federal acts because discrimination 
constitutes a deprivation of liberty under the Fifth Amendment). 
 14. Immigrant domestic violence advocates commonly use this term, but it does not 
imply that battered immigrant women form a homogenous group.  See LETI VOLPP, 
WORKING WITH BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN:  A HANDBOOK TO MAKE SERVICES 
ACCESSIBLE 2 (Leni Marin ed., 1995) (noting that immigrant women are diverse in terms of 
race, sexual orientation, class, length of residence in the United States, and myriad other 
social attributes).  This Comment concentrates on women who are in legally-recognized 
marriages to USC or LPR men, who do not yet have permanent immigrant status, who speak 
little or no English, who do not have economic or logistical access to legal representation, 
and who are eligible to self-petition for VAWA remedies.  See infra Part I.B (describing 
May, a hypothetical battered immigrant woman who will guide the reader through the 
VAWA application process); see, e.g., Zelda B. Harris, The Predicament of the Immigrant 
Victim/Defendant:  “VAWA Diversion” and Other Considerations in Support of Battered 
Women, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (noting that a typical client at the Domestic 
Violence Law Clinic in Tucson, Arizona is a “poor, recently immigrated, non-English 
speaking woman with children”). 
 15. See VOLPP, supra note 14, at v (offering practical advice to domestic violence 
service providers so that they can be more culturally sensitive and reduce barriers to access).  
See generally SUDHA SHETTY & JANICE KAGUYUTAN, IMMIGRANT VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE:  CULTURAL CHALLENGES AND AVAILABLE LEGAL PROTECTIONS (Feb. 2002) 
(noting that family and community resistance, fear of official institutions, and improper 
program design may bar women from services), available at 
http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/vawnet/arimmigrant/arimmigrant.html. 
 16. See VOLPP, supra note 14, at 3-4 (describing tactics that batterers use against 
women, including coercion, threats, isolation, and physical, sexual, emotional and economic 
abuse). 
 17. See Leti Volpp, On Culture, Difference, and Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U.J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 393, 398 (2003) (arguing that focusing on cultural barriers rather 
than institutional ones ignores the racism of agencies and removes the pressure from them to 
make services accessible); see also NANCY MEYER-EMERICK, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN ACT OF 1994:  AN ANALYSIS OF INTENT AND PERCEPTION 102-08 (2001) (arguing 
that VAWA normalizes certain types of violence and may discourage women from 
accessing assistance); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:  Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245-51 
(1991) (critiquing intervention strategies that are solely based on the experiences of women 
who do not share the same race or class background). 
 18. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:  Critical Legal Studies and 
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (explaining that the perspective of 
those on “the bottom” who have experienced discrimination is essential in order to 
understand how systems fail to provide justice).  Despite this paper’s focus on language, the 
discrimination an LEP battered immigrant woman faces based on her lack of English-
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discriminatory nature of USCIS’s facially-neutral VAWA application 
procedures and assess the efficacy of language access laws in gaining 
USCIS’s compliance. 
This Comment argues that USCIS violates Executive Order 13,166 and 
due process by continuing its English-only administration of VAWA in a 
manner that fails to provide LEP battered immigrant women with 
meaningful access to remedies, and excludes from protection the very 
individuals that Congress intended VAWA to embrace.  Part I provides an 
overview of USCIS’s VAWA and language access obligations and how 
May, an LEP battered immigrant woman, is unable to access VAWA 
remedies because of language barriers.  Part II outlines due process 
requirements and argues that USCIS’s current failure to provide language-
accessible services violates LEP battered immigrant women’s heightened 
due process rights to access VAWA remedies.  Part III argues that USCIS’s 
administration of VAWA remedies fails to provide meaningful access for 
LEP battered immigrant women such as May, and reviews May’s options 
for enforcing USCIS’s obligations to her under Executive Order 13,166 and 
the Equal Protection Clause.  Part IV recommends ways in which USCIS 
could improve LEP battered immigrant women’s access to VAWA and 
suggests how Congress could strengthen USCIS’s compliance.  This 
Comment concludes:  (1) USCIS’s current administration of VAWA is 
constitutionally inadequate because it deprives LEP battered immigrant 
women of their liberty interest in VAWA remedies without due process; 
(2) USCIS violates Executive Order 13,166 because its policies fail to 
provide meaningful access to LEP women; (3) even though USCIS’s 
actions constitute intentional discrimination against LEP applicants, it is 
unclear if May has a means to enforce USCIS’s obligations under 
Executive Order 13,166; and (4) Congress should act to close the loophole 
whereby USCIS can evade judicial enforcement of its obligations to LEP 
battered immigrant women. 
                                                                                                                                      
proficiency is interwoven with that based on her gender, her class, her race, and her 
immigration status, and will vary according to her particular social location.  See also Mari 
J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy:  Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. 
L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991) (recognizing that “no form of subordination ever stands alone”).  
See generally Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law:  Prospects for 
Reform After “9-11?”, 7 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 315, 316 (2003) (describing “pernicious 
and institutionalized racial barriers in U.S. immigration laws”); Joan Fitzpatrick, The 
Gender Dimension of U.S. Immigration Policy, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 23, 48 (1997) 
(discussing how U.S. immigration policies disregard “adverse gender-specific effects”); 
Olivia Salcido & Madelaine Aldelman, “He Has Me Tied With the Blessed and Damned 
Papers”:  Undocumented-Immigrant Battered Women in Phoenix, Arizona, 63 HUM. ORG. 
162 (2004) (discussing how undocumented immigration status intersects with and reinforces 
violence against women). 
MORGAN.OFFTOPRINTER 8/9/2005  1:11:04 PM 
490 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:485 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Violence Against Women Act 
After four years of congressional hearings about the social impact of 
violence against women,19 Congress enacted the Violence Against Women 
Act as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994 (“VAWA I”).20  Subtitle G of VAWA I specifically provided 
protections for battered immigrant women and children.21  Subtitle G gave 
USCIS the authority to grant immigration benefits to battered immigrant 
women married to abusive USC or LPR husbands without the abusers’ 
knowledge or consent.22  Prior to this provision, abusers had considerable 
power over their wives’ immigration status because there was no exception 
to the statutory requirement that the LPR or USC spouse file immigration 
paperwork on behalf of the immigrant spouse.23 
Recognizing the need for women to be able to adjust their immigration 
status independently of their abusers, VAWA I created two new types of 
relief for battered immigrant women.24  The first is self-petitioning, which 
allows women eligible for spousal immigration benefits to petition for 
permanent residency without the cooperation of their abusers.25  The 
                                                          
 19. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 112-66 (1994) (recognizing the need for the 
federal government to address the pervasiveness of violence against women and including 
protection for immigrants in Title IV, Subtitle G); H.R. REP. NO. 103-395 (1993) (reporting 
favorably on H.R. 1133, the Violence Against Women Act of 1993, and providing 
protection for immigrants in Title II, Subtitle D); S. REP. NO. 103-138 (1993) (amending S. 
11 and explaining the scope and validity of the civil rights remedy for victims of violence); 
S. REP. NO. 102-197 (1991) (substituting language for S. 15, the Violence Against Women 
Act of 1991, to include a civil rights remedy); S. REP. NO. 101-545 (1990) (amending S. 
2754, the Violence Against Women Act of 1990).  
 20. See VAWA I, supra note 1, §§ 40,001-40,703 (funding educational and social 
programs, and modifying domestic violence criminal treatment). 
 21. See id. at Subtitle G (amending procedures in Section 204 of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (“I.N.A.”) for credible evidence waivers, self-petitioning, and suspension 
of deportation for battered immigrant spouses and children). 
 22. See id. § 40,701 (establishing self-petitioning for battered immigrant spouses and 
children); see also id. § 40,703 (detailing relief for battered immigrant spouses and children 
in deportation proceedings before an immigration judge). 
 23. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., HOW DO I REMOVE THE CONDITIONS 
ON PERMANENT RESIDENCE BASED ON MARRIAGE?, at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/howdoi/remCond.htm (last modified May 7, 2004) (on file with the 
American University Law Review) [hereinafter CONDITIONS] (specifying the standard 
procedure whereby the couple petitions for immigration benefits jointly to avoid USCIS 
initiating removal proceedings).  See generally Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration 
Laws:  The Legacies of Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593 (1991) (discussing the 
incorporation of sex-based discrimination and male domination in immigration laws and its 
impact on women). 
 24. See VAWA I, supra note 1, at Subtitle G (amending the I.N.A. and authorizing 
services to lessen violence against women).  See generally Mayabanza S. Bangudi, The 
Violence Against Women Act, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 489 (2002) (summarizing the 
provisions of VAWA I and VAWA II, including those for battered immigrant women). 
 25. See VAWA I, supra note 1, § 40,701 (providing an exception to standard 
MORGAN.OFFTOPRINTER 8/9/2005  1:11:04 PM 
2004] ACCESS DENIED 491 
second is suspension of deportation, which provides a means for battered 
immigrant women in deportation proceedings to stay in the United States.26 
Congress recognized that the immigration protections of VAWA I 
contained some serious oversights and left some battered immigrant 
women vulnerable and without an immigration remedy.27  Congress 
attempted to address this lack of protection with Division B of the Victims 
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (“VAWA II”),28 Title 
V of which is entitled the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 
2000 (“BIWPA”).29  BIWPA improved procedures such that it authorizes 
self-petitioning for a battered immigrant woman provided that she married 
a USC or LPR in good faith, and that her husband subjected her to battering 
or other extreme cruelty.30  BIWPA also improved relief for suspension of 
deportation (renamed cancellation of removal)31 and established a new U-
visa option for violent-crime victims, providing an option for battered 
immigrant women who otherwise would be ineligible for VAWA relief.32  
However, VAWA II is silent on issues of language access for the 
beneficiaries of its immigration remedies, implicitly entrusting the 
                                                                                                                                      
conditional residency procedures). 
 26. See id. § 40,703 (allowing battered women of good moral character who have been 
in the U.S. for three years to obtain relief where deportation would cause extreme hardship). 
 27. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,192 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of joint managers) 
(noting inadvertent immigration barriers that allow abusers to wield power over women’s 
immigration status and thus hinder women’s safety and ability to leave); see also Cecelia M. 
Espenoza, No Relief For the Weary:  VAWA Relief Denied for Battered Immigrants Lost in 
the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 163 (1999) (arguing that the intersections of 
VAWA I and the criminal justice system re-victimized battered immigrant women); Deanna 
Kwong, Removing Barriers for Battered Immigrant Women:  A Comparison of Immigrant 
Protections Under VAWA I & II, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 145-49 (2002) 
(reviewing the omissions of remedy for battered immigrant women who were divorced or 
not legally married, who had received public assistance, or who had any criminal 
conviction). 
 28. See VAWA II, supra note 2 (strengthening law enforcement, services, and 
education for domestic violence). 
 29. See id. at Title V (improving access to immigration benefits and addressing 
shortcomings of VAWA I). 
 30. See id. § 1503(b)-(c) (revising VAWA I eligibility requirements to include women 
who unknowingly entered into bigamous relationships, had divorced their abusers because 
of violence, or whose spouse had died or renounced citizenship before the petition); see also 
id. § 1503(d) (allowing women with certain criminal histories, such as mandatory arrest for 
violence committed in self-defense, to qualify under good moral character requirements).  
But see, e.g., Harris, supra note 14, at 15-23 (describing the unintended consequences of 
mandatory domestic violence prosecution on a battered immigrant woman’s VAWA 
eligibility); Kwong, supra note 27, at 152 (noting lingering problems with VAWA access 
for women who cannot show marriage to a man legally resident in the United States). 
 31. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1504 (changing treatment of service of Notice to 
Appear so that it no longer terminates a continuous residency period and eliminating time 
limitations on motions to reopen removal and deportation proceedings). 
 32. See id. § 1513 (providing immigration relief for otherwise ineligible battered 
immigrant women who report the crime to police, participate in the investigation, and help 
with the prosecution of the perpetrator). 
MORGAN.OFFTOPRINTER 8/9/2005  1:11:04 PM 
492 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:485 
equitable administration of VAWA benefits to USCIS.33  As a result, 
broader statutory and constitutional obligations define the parameters of 
USCIS’s obligations to LEP battered immigrant women.34 
B. The Story of May, an LEP Battered Immigrant Woman 
To understand how USCIS’s administration of VAWA impacts 
individual applicants, consider a scenario involving May, an LEP 
immigrant woman who married a USC named John last year.35  May is one 
of forty-seven million foreign-born people in the United States who speaks 
a language other than English in the home.36  May is also among the 1.5 
million women per year who are victims of domestic violence in the United 
States.37  John began beating May soon after they got married, and it is 
possible that if she does not leave him, he might kill her.38  Congress 
enacted VAWA to offer immigrant women improved protection against 
domestic violence and to allow them to obtain immigration relief.39  A 
foreign-born person has a greater likelihood of a favorable result on her 
immigration application if she can speak English or if she can get help from 
someone within the legal system.40  However, May does not have anyone to 
                                                          
 33. See id. at Title V (detailing amendments to I.N.A. without addressing means to 
implement the new provisions successfully). 
 34. See infra Part I.C.1 (reviewing Title VI provisions prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of national origin); infra Part II.A (summarizing procedural due process rights as 
applied to LEP individuals’ rights to language accommodation). 
 35. May is a hypothetical LEP battered immigrant woman who will help guide the 
reader through the VAWA process.  See infra Part I.B (describing the barriers that May 
faces at each step of the VAWA application process).  See generally Joann H. Lee, A Case 
Study:  Lawyering to Meet the Needs of Monolingual Asian and Pacific Islander 
Communities in Los Angeles, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.:  J. OF POVERTY L. & POL’Y 172 
(2002) (discussing the real-life experiences of a Korean LEP battered immigrant woman 
attempting to obtain help); Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 1262-64 (detailing the real-life 
experiences of a battered immigrant Latina attempting to access domestic violence services). 
 36. See HYON B. SHIN & ROSALIND BRUNO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE AND 
ENGLISH SPEAKING ABILITY:  2000 2 (Oct. 2003) (noting that this number represents 
eighteen percent of the total population ages five and over who do not speak English at 
home), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf; id. at 2 fig.3 
(reporting that according to the 2000 Census, 28.1 million U.S. residents speak Spanish, two 
million speak Chinese, 1.6 million speak French, one million speak Vietnamese, 0.7 million 
speak Russian, and 0.6 million speak Arabic). 
 37. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:  FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
SURVEY 2 (1998) (approximating 1.5 million rapes or physical assaults on women annually 
by intimate partners based on results of a telephone survey of 8,000 men and 8,000 women). 
 38. Cf. NDVH STATISTICS, supra note 5 (quoting DOJ statistic that intimate partners 
murdered 31,260 women between 1976-1996); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE, 1993-2000 (last revised Feb. 23, 2003) (reporting 1,247 women killed by 
partners in 2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs /abstract/ipv01.htm. 
 39. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(a)(2) (improving remedies to enable women to 
bring charges against abusers without immigration consequences). 
 40. Cf. Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States:  A Case 
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 473-74 (1992) (noting that in asylum cases, an 
MORGAN.OFFTOPRINTER 8/9/2005  1:11:04 PM 
2004] ACCESS DENIED 493 
help her, and she is having a great deal of difficulty accessing the benefits 
offered by VAWA.41 
1. Language barriers to accessing VAWA information 
When John was out, May tried calling the USCIS customer service 
number to explain her situation, hoping the representative could advise her 
on any immigration relief that is available.42  However, this option did not 
work for May because neither the voicemail prompts nor the live operators 
were available in a language she could understand,43  so May hung up.44  
May went to the local library to access the Internet in the hopes of finding 
out basic information about her situation.45  However, the USCIS Website 
was entirely in English and the lone “TRANSLATE” link at the top of the 
page simply led to a page of dense English text suggesting May use a free 
online translation service.46  The machine-translation service mangled the 
translated text so badly that May could not understand what it meant,47  so 
May gave up.48 
May never got to see that the Website also provides a referral to the 
VAWA-funded National Domestic Violence Hotline (“Hotline”).49  The 
Hotline has advocates who can provide assistance in English and Spanish 
and can access telephone interpreters in 139 languages.50  Unfortunately, 
                                                                                                                                      
applicant who has a similar education level, social class, and political orientation as the 
immigration judge has a much stronger probability of a favorable outcome). 
 41. See infra Part I.B (describing the barriers May faced in accessing VAWA remedies 
without outside assistance). 
 42. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., NATIONAL CUSTOMER SERVICE 
CENTER, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/NCSC.htm (last modified May 6, 2004)(on 
file with the American University Law Review)(describing how to access live operators and 
detailing available automated information, such as office locations, how to get forms, and 
basic immigration benefits, but excluding any information on VAWA). 
 43. See id. (asserting that the nationwide service provides “consistent, accurate 
information and assistance,” and is available in English and Spanish, but omitting any 
reference to availability of language interpretation for other LEP customers). 
 44. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (describing how an LEP woman hung up when 
an English-speaking legal services intake worker did not understand her). 
 45. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., HOW DO I APPLY FOR IMMIGRATION 
BENEFITS AS A BATTERED SPOUSE OR CHILD?, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/howdoi 
/battered.htm (last modified Oct. 31, 2003) (on file with the American University Law 
Review) [hereinafter HOW DO I?] (providing details of VAWA’s legal foundation, 
eligibility, and application process in the FAQ section under “Family”). 
 46. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., TRANSLATION INFORMATION, at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/translate.htm (last modified July 15, 2003) (on file with the 
American University Law Review) [hereinafter TRANSLATION] (referring visitors to free 
translation Websites such as AltaVista’s Babelfish). 
 47. See Tongues of the Web, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 2002, at 26 (noting that the “rough 
and ready” quality of machine translation has not improved much in thirty years). 
 48. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (describing how an LEP battered immigrant 
woman gave up trying to get help because of language barriers). 
 49. See HOW DO I?, supra note 45 (referring petitioners to the Hotline phone number 1-
800-799-7233 and TDD 1-800-787-3224 for information on shelters, mental health services, 
legal advice, and information on self-petitioning). 
 50. See NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, NDVH SERVICES, at 
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the USCIS Website fails to mention this important fact, and, to make things 
worse, it buries the referral phone number five screens down in the middle 
of a background paragraph.51  Furthermore, the Hotline is unable to provide 
legal assistance and only can refer May to another agency for further 
help.52 
The lack of language accessibility at USCIS may explain why battered 
immigrant women like May usually seek information from other women in 
the community, immigrant advocacy organizations, domestic violence 
agencies, or immigration professionals.53  Some domestic violence and 
community organizations have made efforts to provide language-accessible 
services to VAWA applicants.54  However, the fact that May can seek 
information elsewhere, or can obtain language-accessible information from 
other sources, does not relieve USCIS of its obligations to LEP women.55 
2. Language barriers to completing a VAWA application 
A community member gave May a copy of the VAWA application, 
Form I-360,56 but it was available only in English and May could not 
understand it.57  Additionally, May was not sure that I-360 was the right 
form since it did not say anywhere that it was for a VAWA claim, even 
though this is the name by which May knows this type of relief.58  The 
language of the form hindered May’s ability to access VAWA remedies 
because, in order to apply, she had to struggle through five pages of 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.ndvh.org/services.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (on file with the American 
University Law Review) [hereinafter NDVH SERVICES] (detailing how the federally-funded 
program attempts to provide Title VI compliant services). 
 51. See HOW DO I?, supra note 45 (advising domestic victims to contact non-profit 
organizations, including the Hotline). 
 52. See NDVH SERVICES, supra note 50 (explaining that advocates will refer callers to 
legal agencies in their local area). 
 53. See Dutton, supra note 8, at 247-48 (analyzing help-seeking behaviors of Latina 
domestic violence victims and finding that they tend to access informal networks and social 
services rather than going to government or law enforcement agencies). 
 54. See, e.g., FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS PROJECT, at http://www.endabuse.org/programs/immigrant/ (last visited Feb. 27, 
2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (providing information on 
battered immigrant women’s issues and translated materials on domestic violence). 
 55. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (requiring federal agencies to 
provide LEP individuals with equivalent services to those provided to English speakers); 6 
C.F.R. § 21.5(a) (2004) (recognizing the obligations of DHS programs under Title VI to 
provide non-discriminatory services). 
 56. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., PETITION FOR AMERASIAN, 
WIDOW(ER), OR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT (Sept. 11, 2000) [hereinafter FORM I-360] (allowing 
designated categories of immigrants to petition for special visa classifications), available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/i-360.htm. 
 57. Cf. Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (describing how an LEP woman failed to get legal 
help because she could not fill out an English language restraining order form correctly). 
 58. See FORM I-360, supra note 56, at Instructions 1 (stating that an applicant may use 
the petition to classify an alien as “a Battered or Abused Spouse or Chid [sic] of a U.S. 
Citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident”). 
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instructions in college-level English and fill out a four-page, ten-part 
application form.59 
May had to send in evidence with her application.60  May could not 
figure out which English-language documents would be appropriate 
evidence,61 and it was difficult for her to obtain some of them without 
arousing John’s suspicion or anger.62  Many of the documents May needed 
are only available in English, from agencies or organizations that may have 
little LEP accommodation to assist May in her quest.63  Additionally, May 
had to send all supporting documentation in English, and she was unable to 
find someone who is competent to translate her foreign language 
documents and who could certify that the translation is accurate.64 
Thus, May’s ability to access, and possibly to obtain, VAWA relief 
depended upon her English language abilities.  The following section 
explores how USCIS’s English-only provision of VAWA information 
contravenes the intent of Executive Order 13,166 to ensure meaningful 
access to applicants irrespective of LEP status. 
C. USCIS’s Language Access Obligations Under Executive Order 13,166 
There is no explicit provision in VAWA on language access for LEP 
women, so a threshold question is whether an agency policy that effectively 
excludes LEP immigrant women like May is contrary to congressional 
intent.65  Even though May is eligible for LPR status based on her familial 
                                                          
 59. See id. at 1-9 (providing application information for VAWA self-petitions).  If May 
overcomes these initial hurdles, she still may think she cannot apply because USCIS has not 
updated the form to include the revised eligibility criteria from VAWA II.  See id. at 
Instructions 1 (specifying that the form’s revision date is September 11, 2000).  In fact, 
according to the language used on the form, many eligible women would think they are 
ineligible for benefits.  See id. at Instructions 2 (including eligibility requirements of current 
marriage to the abuser and current residence in the United States:  criteria that VAWA II 
specifically changed). 
 60. See id. at Instructions 2 (noting that an applicant should file “credible relevant 
evidence of eligibility” with the self-petition). 
 61. See Dutton, supra note 8, at 258 (noting that 78.7% of battered immigrant Latinas 
spoke or read little or no English). 
 62. See VOLPP, supra note 14, at 5 (detailing the hiding or destroying of important 
papers as a means of exerting power and control over the battered spouse). 
 63. See FORM I-360, supra note 56, at Instructions 2 (specifying that appropriate proof 
includes marriage certificates, utility receipts, mortgage documents, police reports, medical 
reports, and bank records). 
 64. See id. at Instructions 1 (specifying English language requirements for all parts of 
the application package). 
 65. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984) (noting that where congressional intent on a particular issue is facially clear, both the 
court and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress”).  Where Congress has not spoken directly to the issue in question, the court will 
defer to an agency’s own interpretation, as long as the statutory interpretation is reasonable.  
See id. at 844-45 (finding valid both explicit and implicit congressional delegation of 
authority to agencies). 
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relationship with her husband,66  under ordinary circumstances she would 
need John to file a form and request removal of her “conditional” 
immigration status.67  John has threatened not to file the necessary 
paperwork,68 and May is afraid that the government will deport her if she 
leaves her husband.69  However, Congress clearly intended to extend 
VAWA remedies to battered immigrant women like May, and she could 
thus apply for immigration relief under VAWA’s self-petitioning 
regulations.70  In fact, Congress appears to have intended to enable all 
battered immigrant women to have access to VAWA immigration 
remedies.71  Thus, by only providing LEP-inaccessible processes and 
procedures that effectively prevent May from accessing VAWA self-
petitioning remedies,72 USCIS contravenes clear congressional intent to 
provide help to all immigrant victims of domestic violence.73  The 
following sections describe how discrimination against LEP individuals is 
covered under Title VI, which in USCIS’s case applies through Executive 
Order 13,166. 
1. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
On July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into 
law.74  The Act codified constitutional anti-discrimination mandates and 
provided for federal action to promote equality and eliminate racial 
discrimination.75  It included provisions to end discrimination in public 
                                                          
 66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (providing for unlimited family-based 
immigration sponsorship for spouses of USCs); cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (2000) (describing 
numerically-restricted preference-based allocation of family visas for spouses of LPRs). 
 67. See CONDITIONS, supra note 23 (specifying that the couple must file Form           I-
751 during the ninety days before the wife’s second anniversary as a conditional resident to 
avoid USCIS initiating removal proceedings). 
 68. Cf. Dutton, supra note 8, at 259 (calculating that in 72.3% of cases, abusive partners 
do not file immigration papers for their foreign-born spouses). 
 69. Cf. id. at 275 (stating that 30.6% of battered women reported that they did not seek 
services because they feared immigration problems). 
 70. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1503(b)(1) (allowing for self-petitioning for victims 
of domestic violence who married in good faith); 146 CONG. REC. S10,192 (daily ed. Oct. 
11, 2000) (explaining that VAWA II attempts to amend immigration laws that allow USC or 
LPR husbands to exploit the immigration system to abuse their immigrant wives further). 
 71. See, e.g., VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1503(b)-(c) (covering women eligible for visas 
based on family relationship); id. § 1504 (covering women in deportation proceedings); id. § 
1505 (providing waivers for women with character or criminal impediments to 
immigration); id. § 1513 (covering women victimized by violence, but who do not have a 
marital relationship to the abuser). 
 72. See supra Part I.B (describing how providing information and application materials 
only in English effectively excludes LEP women from accessing VAWA remedies). 
 73. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984) (stating that, using standard statutory construction, clear congressional intent is the 
law). 
 74. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (outlining federal authority to enforce remedial 
measures that would decrease discrimination). 
 75. See President John F. Kennedy, Address to Congress (Feb. 28, 1963) (noting that 
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accommodations (Title II),76 to enforce school desegregation (Title IV),77 to 
prohibit discrimination in federal programs (Title VI),78 and to promote 
equal employment opportunity (Title VII).79  The basic aim of the Act was 
to provide a statutory solution that prevented federally-assisted programs 
from using taxpayer money to finance discrimination.80 
Under Title VI, Section 601, organizations receiving federal funding 
have an obligation to ensure that:  “[n]o person in the United States shall, 
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”81  
Thus, Section 601 prohibits intentional discrimination, whereby a 
federally-funded program treats a person differently based on their 
membership in a protected group.82 
Title VI, Section 602, authorizes and directs federal agencies that extend 
funding to promulgate implementing regulations.83  The purpose of the 
regulations is to implement the provisions of Title VI, Section 601, and 
thereby outline when differential treatment may warrant agency 
intercession.84  For example, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
implementing regulations state that a funded program “may not . . . on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin:  Provide any disposition, service, 
financial aid, or benefit to an individual which is different, or is provided in 
a different manner, from that provided to others under the program.”85  
                                                                                                                                      
prior legislative and constitutional attempts had not ended racial discrimination), available 
at http://www.congresslink.org/civil/cr1.html. 
 76. See 78 Stat. at 243 (enforcing non-discrimination in commercial establishments). 
 77. See 78 Stat. at 246 (allowing suits against state actors for discriminatory operation 
of public schools). 
 78. See 78 Stat. at 252 (barring discrimination in any program receiving federal funds). 
 79. See 78 Stat. at 253 (providing for equal treatment in hiring, discharge, and 
compensation decisions). 
 80. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 14 (Jan. 
11, 2001) (summarizing statements by President Kennedy and Senator Humphrey during the 
legislative debates on the Civil Rights Act), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/vimanual.pdf. 
 81. See Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. at 252 (countering lingering segregation and 
discrimination supported by federal funding). 
 82. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 n.11 (11th Cir. 
1993) (equating the analysis of intentional discrimination under Title VI to an equal 
protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment).  To prove a violation under Section 
601, a plaintiff must provide evidence to show that “a challenged action was motivated by 
an intent to discriminate.”  See id. at 1406 (detailing factors such as substantial disparate 
impact, agency history, and procedural irregularities as indicative of intent to discriminate). 
 83. See Title VI, § 602, 78 Stat. at 252 (providing a means by which agencies could 
effectuate the non-discriminatory intent of Title VI). 
 84. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (noting that Title VI delegates 
authority to agencies in order to determine kinds of disparate impact that require 
modification of federal policies that produce the disparate impact). 
 85. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs—Implementation of Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2004) (outlining prohibited 
discrimination in the Title VI implementing regulations for federally-assisted programs).  In 
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Therefore, the Act prohibits federally-funded programs not only from 
intentionally discriminating, but also from conducting facially-neutral 
activities that have a disparate impact (i.e., a discriminatory effect) on 
protected groups.86 
2. Executive Order 13,166 
In 2000, President Clinton reiterated the scope of Title VI protection in 
Executive Order 13,166, which requires programs to provide improved 
access to “persons who, as a result of national origin, are limited in their 
English proficiency.”87  Title VI originally excluded from coverage 
federally-conducted programs such as USCIS that were financed and 
operated entirely by the federal government.88  However, Executive Order 
13,166 extended the obligations of Title VI to include federal agencies’ 
own activities and required each agency to prepare and implement a plan to 
improve access by LEP individuals to its services.89  It also required 
agencies to draft Title VI guidance for their funded programs to ensure 
meaningful access for LEP individuals.90  Thus, under Executive Order 
13,166, both federally-funded programs and federally-conducted agencies 
have an obligation to eliminate LEP barriers to full and meaningful 
participation in their activities.91 
                                                                                                                                      
November 2002, Congress transferred immigration responsibilities, including VAWA 
remedies, to the new Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).  See Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, Title IV, Subtitle F, § 471 (2002) 
(codified as amended in 6 U.S.C. § 291) (abolishing the INS under DOJ, and creating 
USCIS under DHS).  Soon after, DHS confirmed that it shared its predecessor’s 
commitment to complying with Title VI.  See 6 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(1)(ii) (2004) (mirroring 
DOJ regulatory language for DHS’s own Title VI implementing regulations). 
 86. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293-94 (noting that Section 602 of Title VI reaches 
disparate impact whereas Section 601 only reaches intentional discrimination).  A three-
prong test exists to evaluate claims of disparate impact discrimination:  (1) whether an 
agency’s action, while facially neutral, has a disproportionate discriminatory impact on a 
protected group; (2) whether the agency can show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the action; and (3) whether the stated reason is pretextual, or if there is a “comparably 
effective alternative practice” which is not discriminatory.  See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 
(borrowing the disparate impact test from Title VII disparate impact cases). 
 87. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (requiring federally-conducted 
and federally-assisted programs to improve access for LEP individuals). 
 88. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, at 15-16 (defining “federal action that is 
not federal financial assistance”). 
 89. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, § 2 (requiring development and implementation of 
LEP plans within 120 days of the Executive Order).  But see S. 557, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(opposing Executive Order 13,166, and attempting to nullify its effect and prohibit the 
appropriation of funds for non-English services). 
 90. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, § 3 (noting that the Title VI guidance should be 
consistent with DOJ Guidance). 
 91. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., EXECUTIVE ORDER 13166 LIMITED 
ENGLISH PROFICIENCY RESOURCE DOCUMENT:  TIPS AND TOOLS FROM THE FIELD, 
Introduction (Sept. 21, 2004), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/lep/tips_and_tools-9-21-
04.htm (on file with the American University Law Review) (noting that Executive Order 
13,166 required:  (1) federal agencies to take steps to provide meaningful access to LEP 
people to federally-conducted programs; and (2) federal agencies that provide financial 
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On the same date that the President issued the Executive Order, the DOJ 
issued a Policy Guidance document to help agencies draft Title VI 
guidelines for programs.92  The DOJ guidance notes that failure to provide 
meaningful access to services for LEP applicants may be discrimination on 
the basis of national origin,93  and the DOJ does not distinguish between 
federally-funded and federally-conducted agencies in this context: 
[W]ith the issuance of Executive Order 13166, for the first time, all 95+ 
federal departments and agencies are also required to develop and 
implement appropriate language assistance plans (LAPs) governing their 
own “federally conducted” programs and activities.  These internal 
federal agency LAPs must be consistent with the standards applicable to 
recipients of federal financial assistance.94 
The DOJ then laid out a four-factor balancing test with which federally-
conducted and funded agencies could verify that they were taking 
reasonable steps toward assuring LEP individuals meaningful access to 
their information and services.95  The agency should consider the following 
factors:  (1) the number or proportion of LEP persons who receive services; 
(2) the frequency with which the agency comes into contact with LEP 
persons; (3) the importance of the agency’s service; and (4) the agency’s 
resources.96  The DOJ later revised and reissued the Policy Guidance97 and 
issued the final guidance document in 2002.98  The basic four-factor test 
remained constant in the various versions.99 
                                                                                                                                      
assistance to other programs to publish guidelines on how to provide meaningful access to 
programs and comply with Title VI). 
 92. See Enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—National Origin 
Discrimination Against Persons With Limited English Proficiency, Policy Guidance, 65 
Fed. Reg. 50,123 (Dep’t of Justice Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Enforcement of Title VI] 
(providing a four-step test and examples to ensure its funded programs were in compliance 
with Title VI obligations to LEP individuals). 
 93. See id. at 50,124 (describing requirements for recipients of federal funding under 
Title VI). 
 94. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (requiring that internal federal 
language assistance plans be consistent with standards applicable to recipients of federal 
funding). 
 95. See Enforcement of Title VI, supra note 92, at 50,124 (providing guidance to 
federal agencies on how to measure compliance with Executive Order 13,166 and Title VI). 
 96. See id. at 50,124-25 (noting that the DOJ designed the test to be flexible and 
variable with agency-specific facts). 
 97. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI 
Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient 
Persons, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,834 (Dep’t of Justice Jan. 16, 2001) (adding quality control and 
agency-specific guidelines to the initial guidance). 
 98. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI 
Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient 
Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,455 (Dep’t of Justice June 18, 2002) [hereinafter Guidance to 
Federal Financial Assistance Recipients] (clarifying, after a notice and comment period, the 
policy on the use of family members as informal interpreters and the minimum requirements 
to establish de facto compliance with translation obligations). 
 99. Compare Enforcement of Title VI, supra note 92, at 50,124-25 (requiring 
assessment of the number of LEP individuals, frequency of contact, importance of the 
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The DOJ test serves as a guide to compliance, and courts should grant 
substantial deference to the guidelines when determining what constitutes a 
Title VI/Executive Order violation.100  While per se compliance with the 
four-factor test may provide evidence of facially meaningful access to 
activities, it does not absolve programs of their responsibility to ensure that 
each individual LEP applicant has meaningful access to benefits.101  
Therefore, if May challenged a federally-funded agency’s language 
accommodations, a court would likely consider the agency’s obligations to 
the general LEP population within the framework of the DOJ policy 
guidance,102 but would do so with reference to specific Title VI obligations 
to May under Section 601.103  Therefore, May can challenge a domestic 
violence shelter that receives federal funding for failing to provide 
translated VAWA information,104 but ironically, has little recourse against 
USCIS.  May can probably bring an administrative claim, but the process is 
notoriously slow and ineffectual.105  May cannot ask the court to enforce 
USCIS’s obligations to provide her with meaningful access because Title 
VI, Section 601 only covers federally-funded agencies, not federal agencies 
                                                                                                                                      
program, and available resources), with Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance 
Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,459-61 (mirroring the basic test from Enforcement of Title 
VI). 
 100. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that 
“administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron 
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority”); Neal v. Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 770 
(9th Cir. 1999) (deferring to the interpretation of Title IX provided in the guidelines of a 
compliance test developed by the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 226 (2003).  But see Mona T. Peterson, Note, The Unauthorized 
Protection of Language Under Title VI, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1437, 1473-74 (2001) (arguing 
that the Department of Health and Human Services exceeded its Title VI authority by 
issuing policy guidelines designed to remedy discrimination against LEP individuals). 
 101. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, § 601 
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (mandating that “[n]o person” shall be discriminated 
against on the basis of national origin and providing collective and individual protection). 
 102. See, e.g., Neal, 198 F.3d at 770 (deferring to agency guidelines for interpretation of 
statutory obligations). 
 103. See, e.g., Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003) 
(finding that plaintiffs stated a claim for intentional discrimination in violation of Section 
601 based on a facially discriminatory policy). 
 104. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,472 
(providing detailed suggestions for domestic violence shelters on accommodations to ensure 
shelters are not discriminating against LEP women in violation of Title VI). 
 105. See, e.g., Alma Lowry, Achieving Justice:  The Case for Legislative Reform, 20 
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 335, 348-49 (2003) (critiquing the agency administrative complaint 
procedure in the environmental protection context for being slow, weak in terms of 
resolution, and lacking any process by which to stay the challenged action).  LEP 
individuals should be able to access administrative solutions via the DOJ’s Civil Rights 
Division, which now bears the primary responsibility for ensuring agency policies do not 
result in a disparate impact on protected groups.  See Guidance to Federal Financial 
Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,466 (detailing the DOJ Title VI voluntary 
compliance complaint procedure).  
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themselves,106 and Executive Order 13,166 is not enforceable in court.107  
Thus, USCIS can, seemingly without the risk of judicial review, ignore the 
requirement to provide meaningful LEP access mandated by the Executive 
Order (its “implied Title VI” obligations).108  USCIS may not ignore the 
obligations imposed by the Constitution, however, and the next sections 
explore whether USCIS is vulnerable to judicial review for violating May’s 
constitutional rights. 
II. USCIS’S ADMINISTRATION OF VAWA AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
The Constitution distinguishes between citizens and non-citizens.109  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that where the Constitution does 
not specifically limit coverage to citizens, it protects all those living in the 
United States, without regard to race or nationality.110  May has lived with 
John in the United States for several years.111  As a result of her presence in 
and affiliation with the community, she has gained an entitlement to 
constitutional protection.112  Thus, May has a right to live free from 
arbitrary deprivations of her life, liberty, or property,113 in the same way as 
any U.S. citizen would.114  The next sections describe how USCIS’s 
                                                          
 106. See Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. at 252 (prohibiting discrimination “under any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”). 
 107. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (specifying that the Order “does 
not create any right . . . enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its 
agencies, its officers or employees, or any person”).  See generally Steven Ostrow, Note, 
Enforcing Executive Orders:  Judicial Review of Agency Action Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 661 (1987) (discussing the difficulty of 
challenging agency action pursuant to an Executive Order because courts rarely recognize a 
valid Administration Procedure Act cause of action). 
 108. But see infra Parts II-III (arguing that USCIS is vulnerable to judicial review for 
both due process and equal protection violations). 
 109. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XV (protecting the right to vote for “citizens of the 
United States”), with id. amend. XIV (extending equal protection and due process of the law 
to “all persons”). 
 110. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (extending due 
process protections to all persons in the United States); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
369 (1886) (extending equal protection to all persons “within the territorial jurisdiction” of 
the United States). 
 111. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 8, at 263 tbl.2 (reporting that the battered immigrant 
Latinas who took part in the study had been in the U.S. for an average of 5.5 years). 
 112. Compare United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) 
(determining that past precedent establishes that constitutional protections apply to those 
who have “come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial 
connections with this country”), and Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce 
an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with 
permanent residence, [her] constitutional status changes accordingly.”), with Shaughnessy v. 
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (refusing to recognize a liberty 
interest in initial entry into the United States and upholding Congress’s authority to 
determine acceptable procedures for denial of entry). 
 113. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law”). 
 114. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (noting that the Due Process 
Clause applies to those present in the United States, “whether their presence here is lawful, 
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administration of VAWA remedies violates May’s rights by depriving her 
of an interest protected by due process. 
A. Background:  Due Process Rights 
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”115  Conversely, 
the government is free to deny privileges without any procedure where 
there is no recognized life, liberty, or property interest.116  The Supreme 
Court has not defined the parameters of liberty, simply noting that it 
encompasses more than freedom from bodily restraint and includes “those 
privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness.”117  Property interests include real and personal property, as well 
as statutory entitlements such as welfare and government employment.118 
Due process applies where the government intentionally infringes on a 
person’s protected interests119 and to prevent arbitrary government action, 
the government must provide fair procedures where protected interests are 
at stake.120  However, the timing and contents of the procedures required 
depend upon the specific factual scenario.121  Thus, May’s entitlement to 
notice of VAWA remedies in a language she can understand depends on 
whether USCIS’s administration of VAWA deprives her of a recognized 
life, liberty, or property interest without due process of law. 
                                                                                                                                      
unlawful, temporary, or permanent”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1976) 
(clarifying that irrespective of immigration status, all persons “within the jurisdiction of the 
United States” receive due process protection against arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty, 
or property); cf. Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right to Seek Asylum in the United 
States:  The Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 303, 333-34 (2001) (arguing that all would-be asylum applicants in the U.S. are 
entitled to fair due process procedures because U.S. statutory grants and commitments to 
international norms have created a liberty and property interest in seeking asylum). 
 115. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 116. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.2, at 581 (2d ed. 1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
has enabled agencies to define interests in such a way as to eliminate the requirements of 
due process by narrowly defining “life, liberty, or property”). 
 117. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (noting that 
the concept of liberty extends beyond criminal imprisonment, and includes the right to 
contract, to marry, and to acquire knowledge). 
 118. See, e.g., id. at 578 (determining due process rights of a non-tenured government 
employee to continued employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) 
(requiring a hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits). 
 119. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986) (requiring more than an 
unintended loss or injury caused by government negligence to constitute a deprivation 
subject to due process). 
 120. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70 (noting that an individual has the right to a prior 
hearing when liberty and property interests are at stake). 
 121. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (noting that due process is 
variable with time, place, and circumstance and requires a balancing of private and 
government interests). 
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1. Due process case law 
The Supreme Court has struggled to define which interests due process 
protects and to determine how to balance competing interests so that due 
process procedures are fair.122  In Goldberg v. Kelley,123 the Supreme Court 
evaluated the elements of due process required before an agency could 
revoke welfare benefits.124  After determining that the right to continued 
welfare benefits was a statutory entitlement,125 the Court noted that the 
agency should consider the individual circumstances of a recipient when 
considering appropriate means to ensure due process.126  In Goldberg, 
because termination of welfare “may deprive an eligible recipient of the 
very means by which to live,” the recipient was entitled to a heightened 
degree of procedural due process.127 
In Mathews v. Eldridge,128 the Supreme Court developed a flexible 
approach to evaluating due process procedural protection with a three-
prong test.129  The test balances the private interest, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation, and the value of the safeguards, and the government’s interest 
in avoiding additional burden.130  In Mathews, the Court distinguished the 
private interest, namely continued receipt of disability benefits, from that in 
Goldberg by determining that disability recipients were not “on the very 
margin of subsistence” and therefore there was a lower degree of potential 
deprivation.131  There was a lesser chance of error than in Goldberg 
because the evidence was factual, not discretionary, and came from 
medical experts, not from the beneficiaries themselves.132  Finally, the 
Court noted the high potential cost of providing pre-termination hearings to 
all disability claimants133 and concluded that such hearings were not 
                                                          
 122. See infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s rulings in 
two seminal cases, Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge, that attempt to define the 
parameters of procedural due process). 
 123. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 124. See id. at 260 (defining the issue as whether the Due Process Clause requires the 
agency to provide an evidentiary hearing to a welfare recipient prior to termination of 
benefits). 
 125. See id. at 265 (concluding that public assistance promotes the general welfare and 
prosperity of society). 
 126. See id. at 268-69 (pointing out, for example, that requiring written submissions of 
recipients with little education is unreasonable). 
 127. See id. at 264 (holding that discontinuation of welfare requires a pre-termination 
evidentiary hearing) (emphasis added). 
 128. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 129. See id. at 334-35 (noting that due process is flexible to a particular situation). 
 130. See id. at 335 (requiring a balancing of governmental and private interests in order 
to ascertain whether administrative procedures meet due process requirements). 
 131. See id. at 340-42 (noting that a disabled person likely has access to other financial 
resources or forms of government assistance in addition to disability payments). 
 132. See id. at 344 (noting that procedural due process requirements vary with the risk of 
error in fact finding). 
 133. See id. at 347 (surmising that claimants would request a hearing in large numbers 
prior to termination of benefits). 
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required in order for the administrative procedures to comport with due 
process.134  Thus, the Court established a context-dependent test for due 
process that provides for notice and hearing procedural requirements that 
vary with the importance of the interest involved.135  A court evaluating 
May’s due process claim would therefore analyze USCIS’s provisions 
within the specific context of an LEP battered immigrant woman 
attempting to assert a VAWA claim. 
2. Language access case law 
Legal advocacy for language access began in the criminal context almost 
a century ago and led to the establishment of a due process right to 
interpretation for LEP criminal defendants.136  Immigrants in deportation 
hearings have a similar Fifth Amendment due process right to language 
assistance.137  Notably, the Ninth Circuit, in Walters v. Reno,138 the only 
appellate court case to discuss an immigrant’s right to written translations, 
used a balancing test similar in scope to the DOJ test as part of its due 
process analysis.139  The court applied the three-prong test from Mathews140 
and concluded that the INS’s policy of sending English-only forms to 
immigrants facing deportation failed to provide constitutionally adequate 
notice of the severe consequences.141  The court weighed the plaintiffs’ 
                                                          
 134. See id. at 349 (noting that present administrative procedures that provided for notice 
and an opportunity to respond, but no hearing, prior to termination were consistent with due 
process). 
 135. See id. at 334 (observing that past cases have shown that due process is flexible and 
varies with time, place, and circumstance). 
 136. See, e.g., Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91 (1907) (noting in dicta that the 
appointment of an interpreter is at the discretion of the trial court); Negrón v. New York, 
434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating that a defendant has a due process right to an 
interpreter if needed to assist with her own defense, receive assistance of counsel, or 
confront witnesses); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2000) (requiring interpreters for LEP parties 
in district court cases where the government is a party).  Unfortunately, the right to an 
interpreter in court addresses only part of the problem of legal access.  See Daniel J. 
Rearick, Note, Reaching Out to the Most Insular Minorities:  A Proposal for Improving 
Latino Access to the American Legal System, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 543, 551-59 
(2004) (describing language barriers to consulting with counsel and accessing the appellate 
process).   
 137. See, e.g., El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
959 F.2d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing due process rights to sufficient translation to 
ensure a “full and fair hearing” during deportation proceedings); Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 
32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring interpretation that allows “the applicant to place his claim 
before the judge” in deportation hearings). 
 138. 145 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 139. Compare id. at 1043 (evaluating immigrants’ due process rights to notice of 
deportation by balancing the importance of the service to the individual with the 
government burden), with Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 
98, at 41,459-61 (providing a four-part test that balances the need for language 
accommodations with availability of agency resources). 
 140. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (evaluating due process 
compliance by balancing the private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value 
of the safeguards, and the government’s interest in avoiding additional burden). 
 141. See Walters, 145 F.3d at 1041 (noting that even individuals with a reasonable 
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interest in not being able to stay in the United States against the 
government’s interest in properly administering immigration laws and 
determined that INS could improve the way it notified immigrants without 
undue burden.142  The court declined to require the INS to translate forms, 
however, even though it said the INS could provide notice effectively by 
using multilingual forms.143  Thus, the court established that LEP 
individuals have due process rights to language assistance in some 
immigration contexts, but still permitted USCIS to define the parameters 
under which it provides such assistance.144 
B. LEP Battered Immigrant Women’s Entitlement to VAWA Remedies 
Due process attaches to statutorily-created entitlements and requires the 
government to follow sufficient procedural safeguards before eliminating 
the interest created.145  With its enactment of VAWA, Congress recognized 
a liberty interest whereby women have a right to live free from violence.146  
In addition, Congress recognized the specific barriers faced by immigrant 
women, such as the fact that May’s ability to leave John and live free from 
violence depends largely on her accessing VAWA relief.147 
May’s entitlement to VAWA remedies is arguably also a property 
right.148  May’s property interest in the continued processing of her 
immigration petition is analogous to a person’s right to continued state 
benefits.149  It is possible that USCIS would treat May as an applicant for a 
benefit, lessening her property entitlement,150  but Congress recognized that 
                                                                                                                                      
command of English would not obtain notice from the legalistic, cumbersome, and 
misleading deportation procedure documents). 
 142. See id. at 1043-44 (noting that INS need make only minor adaptations in the content 
and presentation method of the forms to comply with due process requirements). 
 143. See id. at 1053 (deferring to the INS the determination of the ways in which it could 
revise the forms to communicate information more clearly). 
 144. See id. (reminding INS that it should be consistent in furnishing information to LEP 
applicants). 
 145. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (noting that the state could only 
terminate a statutory entitlement to welfare benefits after completing procedures that 
afforded the beneficiary due process). 
 146. See VAWA I, supra note 1, §§ 40,001-40,703 (providing women protection against 
domestic violence in the form of enhanced arrest and sentencing for violent partners, 
funding for shelters and hotlines, and education and awareness programs); see also VAWA 
II, supra note 2, § 1502(b)(2) (stating that the purpose of the Act is to provide protection 
against domestic violence to immigrant domestic violence victims). 
 147. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(a)(1) (noting that the purpose of VAWA is to 
remove immigration laws that keep battered immigrant women locked in abusive 
relationships). 
 148. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (requiring a 
“legitimate claim of entitlement” to a benefit in order for it to be a property interest).    
 149. Compare VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(a)(2) (providing “protection against 
deportation” for eligible battered immigrant women), with Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63 
(discussing a range of entitlements, such as welfare benefits and public employment, that  
may be regarded as property rights).  
 150. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 116, § 17.5, at 75 (arguing that Supreme Court 
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May’s entitlement to spousal immigration benefits did not diminish simply 
because she married an abusive USC or LPR.151 
If May stays with John for another year, the deadline for him to apply to 
remove the conditions on her residence will arrive.152  John will not likely 
file the necessary paperwork,153 and USCIS will start proceedings to deport 
May.154  If John does not intercept the deportation notice, and if May can 
understand the English in which it is written, she might seek immigration 
assistance.155  If she discloses the abuse to the lawyer, she might learn 
about and apply for VAWA cancellation of removal options.156  Once in 
deportation proceedings, ironically, USCIS must provide May with 
adequate language assistance to access VAWA benefits.157 
Deportation proceedings protect an important liberty interest, which 
justifies the heightened procedures that are necessary to guarantee due 
process.158  However, May and other LEP battered immigrant women have 
a statutory entitlement to immigration remedies that enable them to live 
free from violence before they are placed in deportation.159  Once Congress 
has conferred a property or liberty interest, it may not eliminate it without 
                                                                                                                                      
rulings provide that property entitlements attach, and due process procedures are required, 
only after the government has granted the beneficiary the benefit).  The DOJ has also 
specifically noted that its suggestions on LEP compliance reach applicants for benefits.  See 
FED. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY, KNOW YOUR 
RIGHTS (suggesting that a Food Stamp office that only provides application materials in 
English and requires applicants to provide their own interpreters may be discriminating in 
violation of Title VI), available at http://www.lep.gov/LEP_beneficiary_brochure.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2005).  See generally Virginia Vance, Note, Applications for Benefits, Due 
Process, Equal Protection, and the Right to Be Free From Arbitrary Procedures, 61 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 883 (2004) (addressing the issue of whether an applicant for benefits is 
covered by due process or other safeguards against arbitrary denial). 
 151. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1503(a) (defining the category of persons covered by 
VAWA II to include spouses as defined elsewhere in the I.N.A. for the purposes of family 
immigration). 
 152. See CONDITIONS, supra note 23 (warning that the couple must file Form I-751 
jointly during the ninety days before the second anniversary of becoming a conditional 
resident). 
 153. Cf. Dutton, supra note 8, at 259 (calculating that in 72.3% of cases, abusive USC or 
LPR spouses do not file immigration papers for their spouses). 
 154. See CONDITIONS, supra note 23 (stating that USCIS initiates removal proceedings if 
the petitioner does not file I-751 in a timely manner). 
 155. Cf. Dutton, supra note 8, at 273 tbl.10 (finding that 36.6% of Latinas who had been 
physically and sexually abused accessed immigration services). 
 156. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1504 (specifying requirements for cancellation of 
removal as (i) battery or extreme cruelty, (ii) physical presence in the United States for at 
least three years, (iii) good moral character, and (iv) extreme hardship upon deportation). 
 157. See El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 959 
F.2d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing due process rights to interpretation to ensure a 
“full and fair hearing” during deportation proceedings). 
 158. See Hirsch v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 
1962) (finding that due process requires prescribed procedures in a deportation hearing 
because of the severity of the remedy of deportation). 
 159. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1503 (providing for self-petitioning remedies for 
battered immigrant women). 
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appropriate due process safeguards.160  However, in the absence of 
information in a language she can understand, there is a strong probability 
that May will not find out about available self-petitioning relief or will not 
apply for immigration benefits.161  Thus, USCIS’s administration of 
VAWA remedies effectively deprives May of an entitlement that Congress 
intended her to have.162 
C. USCIS’s Administration of VAWA Violates LEP Battered Immigrant 
Women’s Due Process Rights 
USCIS’s administrative procedures are constitutionally insufficient to 
assure May’s due process right to VAWA remedies.163  The Supreme Court 
has noted that once the government has established an entitlement, 
“[p]arties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in 
order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.”164  Using 
the three-part Mathews test, courts have distinguished due process rights 
inherent in proceedings where the government seeks to deprive an 
individual of liberty from those where an individual seeks an immigration 
status enhancement.165  The following section applies the Mathews test to 
the specifics of May’s situation and determines the extent to which due 
process requires language accommodation for LEP battered immigrant 
women eligible for VAWA remedies. 
1. Application of the Mathews three-prong test 
The first Mathews factor addresses private interests.166  In Mathews, the 
Supreme Court evaluated the private interest of a plaintiff in protecting his 
disability benefits from erroneous termination and determined that the 
interest was low because the recipient had alternative sources of income 
                                                          
 160. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (holding that 
Congress may choose not to create a property interest, but once it has done so, it may not 
deprive the interest holder of that benefit without procedural safeguards). 
 161. See infra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing that on an annual basis an 
estimated 50,000 immigrant spouses are eligible for VAWA benefits); infra note 225 and 
accompanying text (noting that approximately 6,000 individuals apply for VAWA 
annually). 
 162. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(b) (aiming to remove barriers to immigration 
remedies for battered immigrant women). 
 163. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing a three-part test to 
evaluate due process claims that balances private interest against government burden). 
 164. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted) (discussing the long-standing meaning of procedural due process). 
 165. Compare Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding strong 
due process rights for immigrants facing deportation), with Abdullah v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 184 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 1999) (not finding a due process right to 
interpretation for applicants for temporary Seasonal Agricultural Worker status). 
 166. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (detailing the three-part test used to evaluate 
procedural due process requirements). 
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available.167  In contrast, May is more like the welfare beneficiary in 
Goldberg168 and she has a strong interest in accessing VAWA benefits 
because she has no viable alternatives to the immigration assistance 
offered.169 
Congress intended VAWA to grant to immigrant women battered by 
USC or LPR husbands a statutory right to remain in the United States free 
from violence.170  Due process requirements rise with the danger of 
deprivation of liberty.171  Without VAWA relief, there is a likelihood that 
May will stay in the abusive relationship.172  Congress recognized that 
May’s situation is dire whether she stays in an abusive relationship or is 
placed in deportation proceedings and provided an avenue by which May 
can avoid loss of immigration status, deportation, injury, or even death.173 
The second prong of the Mathews test addresses the risk of erroneous 
deprivation and the value of the procedural safeguards.174  USCIS does not 
have “carefully structured procedures” that provide sufficient safeguards 
against mistaken deprivation as required in Mathews.175  In fact, USCIS’s 
procedures are completely inappropriate for the specifics of May’s 
                                                          
 167. See id. at 342-43 (noting that the plaintiff had access to private resources and other 
government aid). 
 168. See 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding that the welfare recipient was entitled to a 
heightened degree of procedural due process because the termination of welfare benefits 
“may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live”); see also supra notes 
123-27 and accompanying text (discussing Goldberg). 
 169. See, e.g., Timothy Pratt, Immigrants in Abusive Homes Often Live in Fear, LAS 
VEGAS SUN, Aug. 18, 2003, at 01 (reporting that a battered immigrant woman only left her 
abusive husband after she learned of VAWA remedies that would allow her to stay in the 
U.S. with her three children). This is not to say that May will passively endure the violence 
if she does not gain access to VAWA; battered immigrant women employ a range of 
survival strategies from talking with other women, obtaining a protective order, or calling 
the police.  See, e.g., VOLPP, supra note 14, at 21-34 (discussing how advocates can help 
battered immigrant women with civil, criminal, and safety options). 
 170. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(a)(3) (explaining that one purpose of VAWA is 
to remove barriers that prevent USCIS from offering immigration assistance to battered 
immigrant women). 
 171. See Abdullah v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 184 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 
1999) (finding deportation to be a more important due process right than refusal of a work 
visa). 
 172. Cf. Dutton, supra note 8, at 284 tbl.17 (noting that 11.5% of battered immigrant 
Latinas with an abusive USC or LPR spouse did not access services because they feared 
immigration consequences); Harris, supra note 14, at 12-13 (describing five typical 
responses of a battered immigrant woman to domestic violence, such as leaving the house, 
calling a friend, or defending herself, but noting that women rarely sought police or state 
assistance because of fear of immigration consequences). 
 173. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,195 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (introducing VAWA II to 
Congress and noting that its aim was to prevent abusers from using immigration law to 
prevent a battered immigrant woman from reporting the abuse or leaving the relationship). 
 174. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing a three-part test to 
evaluate due process). 
 175. See id. at 346 (finding the administrative procedures to be fair and reliable and in 
line with due process requirements). 
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situation.176  May’s lack of English proficiency affects her understanding of 
the VAWA application process and increases the risk of USCIS 
erroneously denying her eligibility because she may misunderstand the 
questions asked, miss important deadlines for filing, or incorrectly fill out 
the form.177 
In addition, if May makes a mistake on her VAWA application, USCIS 
may delay her eligibility for welfare benefits and work authorization, 
placing her in a precarious economic situation and increasing the impact on 
her liberty interest to live free from violence.178  If USCIS provided 
translated VAWA materials at the information and application stage, May 
could understand and comply with the procedural requirements.179  Thus, 
the additional procedures May seeks are well-targeted to reducing the risk 
of erroneous deprivation.180 
The third Mathews factor addresses the government’s interest in 
avoiding additional burden.181  In Mathews, the Supreme Court found that 
there was a significant public interest in not providing evidentiary hearings 
for all benefit-termination cases because of the substantial on-going cost.182  
In contrast, USCIS could provide cost-effective access by translating Form 
I-360 once and having copies available for multiple applicants until it next 
revises the form.183  Obviously, the cost impact rises with the number of 
                                                          
 176. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (arguing that written evidentiary 
requirements violated due process requirements for welfare recipients, most of whom lacked 
the education necessary to complete the paperwork). 
 177. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (describing how an Asian LEP battered 
immigrant woman failed to get relief because of procedural problems with the court 
paperwork). 
 178. See Immigration Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(6)(ii) (2004) (noting that USCIS can 
make a prima facie petition determination only if the applicant has fulfilled I-360 
requirements and provided evidence to support her claim). 
 179. Cf. Erin Adamson, Spanish-Language Legal Forms to Help Workers, Immigrants, 
TOPEKA CAPITAL J., Oct. 8, 2003, at A10 (explaining that the Kansas court system planned 
to translate its domestic violence protection forms to enable battered immigrant women to 
comprehend the process and access the system). 
 180. Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (deciding that an oral 
hearing was not required where benefit decisions were largely made on the basis of standard 
medical reports), with Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269 (requiring an oral hearing for welfare 
recipients who “lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who 
cannot obtain professional assistance”). 
 181. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335  (balancing the fiscal and administrative burdens 
assumed by the government). 
 182. See id. at 347-48 (noting that benefits of providing the hearings must be weighed 
against the public interest in avoiding the cost). 
 183. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ASSESSMENT OF THE TOTAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13166:  IMPROVING ACCESS TO SERVICES FOR 
PERSONS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY 36 (Mar. 14, 2002) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT] 
(noting translation cost for I-360 as about $200 per language), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/lepfinal3-14.pdf.  In 2002, the Office of 
Management and Budget estimated that INS could translate all 123 of its forms into five 
languages for less than $150,000.  See id. at 40 (emphasizing that this would be a one-time, 
not an annual cost). 
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languages required, and it is likely VAWA applicants speak and read 
multiple languages.184  However, a theoretical cost impact lacks credence, 
especially when USCIS cannot prove it because of its own failure to 
compile statistics on the languages spoken by those who seek its 
services.185 
In addition, the DOJ Guidance provides for varying levels of language 
accommodation depending on the number of LEP persons who speak a 
particular language.186  Even if there is a significant cost impact for 
translating information and evidence, cost factors alone cannot override 
overwhelming due process considerations under the other two prongs.187  
Finally, the equal availability of VAWA remedies benefits society at large 
because May will be free to pursue criminal remedies against her abuser as 
originally envisioned by Congress, thus preventing further damage to 
society caused by domestic violence.188  Thus, each prong of the Mathews 
test weighs heavily in favor of May, indicating that she has a due process 
right to LEP-compliant procedures by which she may access VAWA 
remedies. 
2. Constitutionally adequate notice 
By limiting May’s access to VAWA, USCIS’s lack of LEP-compliant 
procedures deprives May of her liberty interest in VAWA relief in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.189  May cannot assert a claim 
                                                          
 184. See id. at 35-36 (indicating that about twenty-five percent of all USCIS customers 
speak Spanish and an additional two percent each speak Hindi, Chinese, Tagalog, and 
Arabic); SHIN & BRUNO, supra note 36, at 2 fig.3 (reporting that according to the 2000 
Census, 28.1 million U.S. residents speak Spanish, two million speak Chinese, 1.6 million 
speak French, one million speak Vietnamese, 0.7 million speak Russian, and 0.6 million 
speak Arabic). 
 185. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 43 (commenting that INS does not maintain 
documentation on the language requirements of the people it serves). 
 186. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,460 
(allowing for a flexible combination of oral and written language accommodations 
depending upon a four-factor analysis of the number of LEP persons and the importance of 
the service). 
 187. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (placing the burden on the agency 
to find ways to accommodate increased costs associated with constitutionally-required 
procedures); Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,460 
(noting that large entities clearly must substantiate any argument that lack of resources 
limits their provision of LEP language access); Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The 
New Asylum Rule:  Improved But Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 57 (2001) (noting 
USCIS’s obligation to provide interpretation services to asylum seekers where the cost is a 
fraction of its budget). 
 188. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(b)(1) (removing barriers to criminal 
prosecution of abusers of immigrant women as part of a comprehensive federal domestic 
violence prevention program). 
 189. Cf. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1998) (determining that INS 
forms were constitutionally inadequate because they failed to inform LEP immigrants of 
their options). 
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if she has no notice of its availability as a remedy.190  Even though May is 
not (yet) in deportation proceedings, her liberty interest in gaining relief 
from violence heightens the due process requirements of her situation and 
places it on a par with the rights of the plaintiffs in Walters.191  In Walters, 
the Ninth Circuit held that, without inordinate hardship, the INS could 
simplify the content and presentation of its forms and provide 
constitutionally adequate notice to LEP immigrants facing deportation.192 
USCIS similarly has a Fifth Amendment obligation to provide 
constitutionally adequate notice, including notice through Form       I-360, 
which adequately informs May of her rights and the consequences to her of 
not filing the form.193  Protection of May’s due process rights requires that 
USCIS provide LEP applicants with language assistance so that they may 
participate effectively in the VAWA process.194  An English-only process 
fails to provide a constitutionally-adequate procedure,195 and in order not to 
deprive May and other LEP battered immigrant women of access to 
remedies, USCIS should provide translations of information and evidence 
as needed.196  Additionally, provision of LEP-compliant services enables 
USCIS to interpret and administer VAWA remedies equitably and in line 
with congressional intent.197  In light of the foregoing analysis that May has 
a due process right to access VAWA remedies, the lack of judicial review 
of USCIS’s failure to comply with Executive Order 13,166 and its implied 
Title VI obligations seems particularly troublesome.  The following section 
examines whether May has any means by which to gain USCIS’s 
compliance. 
III. ENFORCING USCIS’S OBLIGATIONS TO LEP BATTERED IMMIGRANT 
WOMEN 
Executive Order 13,166 extended implied Title VI national origin 
                                                          
 190. See supra Part I.B (detailing the ways in which failure to provide LEP-compliant 
Websites, information, application forms, and the requirement of English-language evidence 
hinders May’s access to VAWA remedies). 
 191. Cf. Walters, 145 F.3d at 1043-44 (balancing the plaintiffs’ significant interest in 
avoiding deportation with the government’s interest in administering immigration laws). 
 192. See id. at 1044 (noting that the benefits of the procedural safeguards against 
deportation outweighed the burden of making the changes). 
 193. See id. at 1042 (determining that a complex English form advising LEP immigrants 
of deportation procedures failed to inform them adequately so that they could waive their 
rights knowingly). 
 194. Cf. Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring translation services 
that allow an applicant to assert a claim effectively in deportation hearings). 
 195. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) (“The opportunity to be heard 
must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”). 
 196. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,463 
(warning that failure to translate vital documents “may effectively deny LEP individuals 
meaningful access” to programs and services). 
 197. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(b)(2) (offering protection against domestic 
violence to battered immigrant women). 
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discrimination obligations to federally-conducted agencies such as 
USCIS.198  The Executive Order requires the agency to ensure “meaningful 
access”199 to its programs for LEP applicants and recipients of benefits.200  
The following discussion illustrates how USCIS’s provision of English-
only VAWA materials, despite regulations and guidance encouraging LEP-
accessibility, contravenes the intent of the Executive Order and its 
associated implied Title VI obligations. 
A. “Meaningful Access” for LEP Battered Immigrant Women 
1. Case law 
The Supreme Court first correlated language and national origin 
discrimination in a Title VI case in Lau v. Nichols.201  In Lau, a group of 
Chinese-speaking students challenged their school district’s policy of 
providing instruction in English only.202  The Supreme Court concluded 
that the school district’s policies conflicted with the goals of Title VI, as 
implemented in the district’s own regulations,203 because a significant 
number of LEP students were unable to access the benefits of a federally-
assisted program.204  The holding relied on Section 601 to reverse the court 
of appeals decision205 and thus implicitly recognized a private right of 
action against agencies whose actions had a disparate impact on protected 
groups in violation of Title VI, Section 602 implementing regulations.206 
Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lau, the Eleventh Circuit, 
in Sandoval v. Hagan,207 found that a policy of the Department of Public 
                                                          
 198. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (requiring federally-conducted 
agencies to provide LEP individuals with equivalent access to that provided to English 
speakers); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (requiring that internal federal 
language assistance plans be consistent with standards applicable to recipients of federal 
funding). 
 199. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. at 290.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 
287, 302 (1985) (finding that a fourteen day limit on Medicaid services was facially neutral 
and did not deny “meaningful access” to benefits for qualified individuals who had a 
handicap); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (finding that English-only education 
denied Chinese-speaking students a “meaningful opportunity” to participate in the 
educational program). 
 200. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. at 290. 
 201. 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974). 
 202. Id. at 564. 
 203. See id. at 567 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1)) (noting that the department’s Title 
VI implementing regulations issued pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI prohibited schools 
from providing differential services and restricting access to programs). 
 204. See id. at 564 (discussing how the school district denied 1,800 Chinese students 
supplemental English instruction and thus barred their access to other curricula). 
 205. See id. at 566 (finding Section 601 of Title VI sufficient to reverse the lower court’s 
ruling and therefore not reaching an Equal Protection Clause argument). 
 206. See id. at 568 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2)) (discussing the bar on discrimination 
in regulations passed under Section 602, “which has [discriminatory effect] even though no 
purposeful design is present”). 
 207. 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
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Safety to provide driver’s license examinations only in English had an 
unlawful disparate impact on LEP individuals in violation of Title VI.208  
The Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Sandoval,209 overturned the lower 
court’s decision and held that the plaintiffs had no private right of action to 
enforce a disparate impact claim.210  However, the Court did not address 
the merits of the case and left intact a private right of action for intentional 
discrimination claims.211  Thus, while there remains some debate about the 
broader implications of the Supreme Court’s holding in Sandoval for Title 
VI disparate impact claims,212  it appears that the correlation of language 
and national origin articulated in Lau213 is still good law.214 
2. USCIS does not provide meaningful access to VAWA 
The DOJ Guidelines state that federally-funded agencies must ensure 
that LEP individuals like May have “meaningful access” to programs.215  
The DOJ and DHS Title VI implementing regulations support this goal and 
                                                          
 208. See id. at 508 (noting that 13,000 residents could not obtain licenses because of the 
English requirement, that the majority of these LEP individuals were from a country of 
origin other than the United States, and that the Department made accommodations for other 
disadvantaged groups such as the deaf and disabled). 
 209. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 210. See id. at 293 (holding that Title VI does not create a private right of action to 
enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Section 602). 
 211. See id. at 278 (noting that the only question presented was whether private 
individuals may sue to enforce Section 602 disparate-impact regulations).  Sandoval, in 
effect, did for Title VI plaintiffs what the Supreme Court had done to equal protection 
plaintiffs fifteen years earlier:  required them to prove intentional discrimination in order to 
state a claim.  Compare id. at 293 (eliminating a private right of action to enforce disparate-
impact regulations promulgated under Section 602, and leaving intentional discrimination 
under Section 601 as the only cause of action), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 
(1976) (stating that disproportionate impact alone is insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny for 
invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 212. Compare ProEnglish v. Bush, No. 02-2044, 2003 WL 21101726, at *2, *4 (4th Cir. 
May 15, 2003) (citing the district court’s interest in plaintiff’s claim that equation of 
language and national origin is unconstitutional, but upholding prior dismissal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction), with Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra 
note 98, at 41,458 (stating that the DOJ rejects the argument that Sandoval strikes down 
Title VI regulations).  See generally Note, After Sandoval:  Judicial Challenges and 
Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774 (2003) 
(discussing the explicit and implicit ramifications of Sandoval on individuals’ private right 
of action). 
 213. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (including disparate impact based on 
provision of English-only services to Chinese-speaking students in regulations banning 
discrimination based on national origin). 
 214. See Memorandum from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Heads of Departments and Agencies General Counsels and 
Civil Rights Directors 2 (Oct. 26, 2001) (stating that Sandoval does not strike down Title 
VI’s disparate impact regulations, and using the facts of Lau as an example of disparate 
impact discrimination on the basis of national origin), available at 
http://www.napalc.org/files/Boyd_Memorandum.pdf. 
 215. See Enforcement of Title VI, supra note 92, at 50,124 (noting that agencies that fail 
to provide meaningful access may be discriminating on the basis of national origin in 
violation of Title VI). 
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emphasize funded agencies’ responsibilities to provide LEP individuals 
with the same services as English-speakers.216  The Executive Order and 
the DOJ hold USCIS to the same standards as funded agencies.217  In Lau, 
the Supreme Court found that the lack of provision of language assistance 
to LEP students effectively barred their ability to participate in the 
curriculum.218  The Court reasoned that Chinese-speaking students were 
likely “to find their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and in 
no way meaningful” in an English-only environment.219 
Similarly, meaningful access in the VAWA context requires that all 
eligible battered women are able to access immigration remedies; however, 
USCIS’s current English-only administration of VAWA benefits denies 
LEP women like May necessary information and effectively prevents them 
from obtaining relief.220  In the case of VAWA, where LEP applicants like 
May make up a large proportion of the population that needs to access 
services,221 the dearth of translated materials and other linguistically-
accessible services does not provide battered immigrant women meaningful 
access to VAWA’s benefits.222 
                                                          
 216. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs—Implementation of Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2004) (prohibiting provision of 
different services or providing services in a different manner); Nondiscrimination on the 
Basis of Race, Color, or National Origin in Programs or Activities Receiving Federal 
Financial Assistance from the Department of Homeland Security, 6 C.F.R. § 21.5(b) (2004) 
(mirroring DOJ regulatory language of 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) in DHS’s Title VI 
implementing regulations); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1985) 
(explaining how Title VI, Section 602 delegates determination of disparate impact 
discrimination to a federal agency). 
 217. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (clarifying that while Title VI itself 
only covers funded agencies, federally-conducted agencies are held to the same standards). 
 218. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564 (1974) (finding disparate impact 
discrimination where students in some school districts did not receive language assistance in 
violation of state guidelines). 
 219. See id. at 566 (rejecting the assertion that there could be equality of treatment for 
LEP students where the school provided identical facilities, teachers, and curriculum, as 
they did for English-speaking students). 
 220. Cf. Sula Pettibon, Meza Family’s Deaths Reveal Gaps in Domestic Violence 
Services, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Aug. 15, 2004, at 1A (reporting that provision of 
domestic violence outreach and legal services to Spanish-speaking women increased from 
thirty-five cases in the first year to 300 cases in subsequent years when the agency made 
Spanish language information available), available at http://www.herald 
online.com/local/story/3744996p-3351426c.html. 
 221. Cf. Dutton, supra note 8, at 258 (noting that 78.7% of the battered immigrant 
Latinas surveyed spoke or read little or no English). 
 222. See Adamson, supra note 179, at 10A (quoting Kansas Supreme Court Chief Justice 
saying that translated forms would help battered immigrant women understand how to 
proceed legally in domestic violence situations); Lee, supra note 35, at 184 (arguing that in 
order to ensure LEP clients have full access to legal services, providers should remove 
structures, such as providing English-only information, that bar LEP clients from access). 
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a. USCIS’s VAWA application numbers do not reflect the number of
 eligible women 
Application numbers are a starting point from which an agency can 
determine the number or proportion of LEP persons who receive services 
and the frequency with which the agency comes into contact with LEP 
persons.223  However, the number of people who apply for services may be 
different than the number of people who are eligible for services, but who 
fail to apply.224  USCIS deals with an average of twenty-three VAWA 
petitions per day.225  However, this number fails to include other contacts 
with USCIS prior to filing the petition, such as phone inquiries, Website 
browsing, or personal office visits.226  It also fails to include potential 
applicants like May who, because of language barriers, do not learn about 
and cannot access the services.227 
Based on the annual number of binational marriages and estimated rates 
of domestic violence, almost 75,000 battered immigrant women each year 
may be eligible for VAWA benefits.228  Yet, USCIS processes around 
6,000 VAWA claims each year,229  and does not compile any data on how 
many VAWA applications come from LEP battered immigrant women.230  
However, if VAWA applicant characteristics match those of the general 
USCIS applicant pool, each year roughly 18,500 VAWA-eligible women 
are LEP.231  Application numbers that do not adequately reflect the eligible 
                                                          
 223. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,459-
60 (outlining two of four elements of the DOJ’s test for Title VI compliance). 
 224. See id. at 41,463 (noting that lack of awareness of a program denies LEP 
individuals meaningful access). 
 225. See AILA INFONET, DHS ANSWERS QUESTIONS ON VAWA PETITIONS AND 
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS, AND ON U PETITIONS, at http://www.aila.org/infonet (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) [hereinafter AILA] 
(reporting that in 2003, USCIS received 6,700 self-petitions, up from 5,922 the previous 
year). 
 226. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., USCIS PRIORITIZES BACKLOG 
REDUCTION IN FY 2005 BUDGET (Feb. 2, 2004), at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/ 
publicaffairs/newsrels/backlogfy2005.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (on file with the 
American University Law Review) [hereinafter BUDGET] (calculating that each day USCIS 
receives 100,000 Web hits, takes 50,000 calls at its National Call Centers, and sees 25,000 
visitors at its district offices). 
 227. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 8, at 275 (calculating that almost one-quarter of abused 
immigrant Latinas did not seek services because of English language problems); Pettibon, 
supra note 220 (noting a ten-fold increase in the number of cases involving Spanish-
speaking women once the agency instituted language-accessible services). 
 228. Compare Immigration & Naturalization Serv., supra note 7 (noting that the U.S. 
admitted 294,798 spouses of USCs and 28,874 spouses of LPRs in 2002), and U.S. Comm’n 
on Immigration Reform, supra note 5 (stating that approximately two-thirds of immigrant 
spouses are female), with Dutton, supra note 8 (estimating that thirty-four percent of 
immigrant women experience domestic violence). 
 229. See AILA, supra note 225 (noting that the annual number of self-petitions has 
increased in past years). 
 230. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 43 (commenting that INS does not maintain 
documentation on the language requirements of the people it serves). 
 231. Cf. id. at 35-36 (indicating that about twenty-five percent of all USCIS customers 
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community provide evidence that the lack of language accessibility fails to 
provide meaningful access to enable an LEP individual to take advantage 
of services.232 
The greater the number or proportion of LEP persons an agency serves, 
the more likely it is that the agency needs to provide language services,233 
and USCIS’s lack of LEP services negatively impacts the successful 
implementation of VAWA’s objectives.234  In addition, the more frequently 
the agency has contact with LEP individuals, the more likely it is that it 
needs to provide language services.235  USCIS has failed to meet its 
Executive Order 13,166 and implied Title VI obligations to provide 
meaningful access to VAWA remedies for LEP applicants for whom 
USCIS provides only English information236 and for the high number of 
potential applicants who are unable to access VAWA due to language 
barriers.237 
An agency’s lack of action in spite of regulations and administrative 
guidance suggesting action eviscerates the intent of Executive Order 
13,166 to eliminate discrimination against protected groups.238  Thus, 
USCIS’s provision of English-only VAWA materials, despite regulations 
and guidance encouraging LEP-accessibility, contravenes the intent of the 
Executive Order and its associated implied Title VI obligations.239  DHS 
implementing regulations forbid the restriction of “the enjoyment of any 
advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any . . . benefit under 
the program.”240  DOJ holds federally-conducted programs to the same 
                                                                                                                                      
speak Spanish and an additional two percent each speak Hindi, Chinese, Tagalog, and 
Arabic). 
 232. Cf. Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1408 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(describing plaintiffs’ argument that underutilization of a school resulted from the school 
district’s refusal to distribute information). 
 233. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,459 
(noting that agencies must include previously-excluded populations who are eligible for 
services but cannot access services because of language barriers). 
 234. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(a)(1) (noting that one of VAWA II’s objectives 
was to remove immigration barriers that kept women in abusive relationships). 
 235. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,460 
(noting that the agency should vary the level of service with frequency of contact). 
 236. See, e.g., Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003) 
(acknowledging that Title VI implementing regulations give an LEP person the right to 
receive information in a language they understand). 
 237. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (finding that Title VI prohibits 
use of English-only materials where it excludes LEP individuals from activities). 
 238. See Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 804 (noting that long-term noncompliance of 
the agency with requirements for bilingual services, in violation of the Food Stamp Act and 
its regulations, could show intent to discriminate against LEP recipients). 
 239. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 568-69 (emphasizing that the school district’s discriminatory 
treatment of LEP students was against Congress’s Title VI intent to prevent taxpayer money 
from facilitating discrimination). 
 240. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Race, Color, or National Origin in Programs 
or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance from the Department of Homeland 
Security, 6 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(1)(iv) (2004) (enumerating specific discriminatory actions 
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standards as they hold their funded programs.241  Under DOJ guidelines, 
USCIS should provide language assistance so as not to deny an LEP 
battered immigrant woman like May effective access to VAWA 
immigration benefits.242  This requirement would include translating “vital 
written materials” into the language of each regularly encountered group.243 
b. The lack of translated forms inhibits LEP women’s ability to apply 
for VAWA 
 No case explicitly addresses the right of LEP individuals to have routine 
forms translated into a language they understand.244  However, a court 
would likely defer to DOJ’s guidance to determine an agency’s 
responsibility toward LEP individuals under Title VI and the Executive 
Order.245  Under DOJ guidelines, USCIS’s administration of VAWA fails 
to meet implied Title VI requirements because its translation policy fails to 
provide “meaningful access” for LEP battered immigrant women like 
May.246 
The DOJ Policy Guidance describes a “safe harbor” provision whereby a 
federally-funded agency can establish prima facie compliance with Title VI 
by meeting two requirements:  (1) providing translations of “vital 
documents” for each LEP group that constitutes the lesser of five percent of 
the eligible population or 1,000 individuals, and (2) providing written 
notice, in a language the LEP recipient can read, that sight translation of 
documents is available for language groups comprised of fewer than fifty 
people.247  DOJ holds USCIS to the same obligations as its funded 
agencies.248  Unfortunately, USCIS’s lack of required record-keeping about 
                                                                                                                                      
prohibited by Title VI). 
 241. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (requiring that internal federal 
language assistance plans be consistent with standards applicable to recipients of federal 
funding). 
 242. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,461 
(explaining that reasonable language accommodations must be timely, and provided so as 
not to place a burden on the LEP person). 
 243. See id. at 41,464 (attempting to ensure effective LEP access to program materials 
by establishing a bright line rule whereby DOJ will consider an agency in compliance with 
Title VI if it translates vital documents for each LEP language group that constitutes five 
percent of 1,000 of its clientele, and if it provides translated notice to others of the right to 
receive sight translation of written materials in their own language). 
 244. But see Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003) 
(acknowledging plaintiffs’ claim that the agency violated Title VI regulations by sending 
out materials in English only). 
 245. See Neal v. Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 1999) (deferring to the 
interpretation of Title IX provided in the guidelines of a compliance test developed by the 
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 226 (2003).  
 246. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,463-
64 (providing guidance on how an agency should determine what “vital” documents it needs 
to translate in order to be in compliance with Title VI). 
 247. Id. at 41,464. 
 248. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (requiring that internal federal 
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which languages VAWA applicants and prospective applicants speak 
hinders any accurate assessment of specific language translation needs.249  
However, an application of general population language prevalence 
estimates250 to the number of eligible LEP VAWA applicants on an annual 
basis251 indicates that the lack of any translated version of Form I-360 can 
be nothing but prima facie evidence that USCIS has not satisfied the “safe 
harbor” requirements.252 
The fact that Form I-360 is available only in English presents a 
considerable barrier to May’s ability to access VAWA benefits.253  Such 
barriers have failed to pass court scrutiny in the past.  For example, in 
Sandoval, the Department of Public Safety offered a driver’s license test in 
English only.254  As a result, thousands of LEP Alabama residents had 
difficulty getting a driver’s license and could not obtain employment or 
other life essentials.255  By publishing Form I-360 in its current format, 
USCIS has similarly failed to consider the demographics of the target 
population and the negative impact of providing services in English only.256  
USCIS’s failure to provide an essential VAWA document in translation 
deprives LEP battered immigrant women of the opportunity to access 
VAWA benefits equally.257  For a couple of hundred dollars per language, 
USCIS could translate I-360 so that May, and others similarly situated, 
would have access to the same information as English speakers.258  By 
                                                                                                                                      
language assistance plans be consistent with standards for federal funding recipients). 
 249. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 43 (commenting on the general lack of INS 
documentation regarding languages spoken by the people it serves). 
 250. See  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  2000 2 (Dec. 2001)  (calculating that fifty-one percent of the foreign-born 
in the U.S. come from Latin America, one-quarter come from Mexico, with China and India 
accounting for the next highest numbers), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-206.pdf. 
 251. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (estimating that USCIS processes 6,000 
VAWA applications each year); supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text (calculating that 
there are 75,000 potential applicants and that approximately one-third of USCIS contacts are 
LEP). 
 252. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,464 
(listing the translation of vital documents as one of two requirements for establishing prima 
facie compliance with Title VI). 
 253. Cf. Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (describing how an LEP woman failed to get legal 
help because she could not fill out an English language restraining order form correctly). 
 254. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 489-90 (11th Cir. 1999) (comparing 
accommodations the Department of Public Safety offered to other disadvantaged residents, 
such as those who were deaf or illiterate). 
 255. See id. at 489 (stating that the policy affected some 13,000 residents, the vast 
majority of whom were foreign-born). 
 256. See Dutton, supra note 8, at 262 tbl.2 (showing that almost half of all abused 
Latinas had no English reading ability and almost three-quarters had little or none). 
 257. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1410 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(asserting that an agency’s failure to share information with the public gives rise to an 
inference of a discriminatory motive). 
 258. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 36 (reporting that in 2000, estimated 
translation costs were $189 to $214 per document). 
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providing I-360 in English-only, USCIS demonstrates its lack of concern 
with its implied Title VI obligations and its blatant disregard of the 
guidance provided by the DOJ balancing test.259 
c. USCIS’s evidence requirements bar meaningful access 
Similarly, the VAWA evidentiary procedure is confusing and 
misleading, especially to a non-English speaker like May, and it impedes 
LEP battered immigrant women’s abilities to access VAWA benefits.260  
For example, to assert a VAWA claim, May must provide evidence that she 
entered into the marriage in good faith, that John is a USC or LPR, that she 
is a victim of extreme cruelty or abuse, and that she is of good moral 
character.261  Form I-360 “encourages” May to submit various types of 
acceptable credible evidence, including marriage certificates, utility 
receipts, mortgage documents, police reports, affidavits, medical reports, 
and bank records.262  In fact, May must submit evidence in order for USCIS 
to consider her application and authorize the work authorization or welfare 
benefits she needs to survive without John’s economic support.263  USCIS 
does allow May to submit other credible evidence if she cannot obtain the 
                                                          
 259. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,459-
61 (suggesting that, to determine its Title VI obligations to LEP individuals, an agency 
consider the number of LEP persons who receive services, the frequency of contact, the 
importance of the service, and resources).  As of December 2001, USCIS had translated just 
11 of its 123 public-use forms.  See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 36-37 (noting that 
USCIS had translated 11 forms into Spanish and 8 of them into additional languages, 
including some in Icelandic and Swedish).  It appears to have translated an additional 3 
forms since then.  See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FORMS AND FEES, at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/ formsfee/forms/index.htm (last modified Feb. 4, 2005) (supplying 
translated versions of forms G-14, G-731, and I-131) (on file with the American University 
Law Review).  However, seven of the forms listed in the OMB report are not available 
online in translation, three of them have actually been removed from the website in the last 
six months.  See id. (providing links only to English versions of forms I-9, I-90, I-94, I-
94W, I-821, I-823, and I-855, which the OMB report indicated were available in 
translation).  When the visitor clicks on the English form name and scrolls down to the 
bottom of the description of the form, she can determine if a translated version is available.  
See id.  In almost all cases, USCIS lists only an English version.  See id.  The lack of 
multilingual forms, coupled with the English-only Website, renders much of the information 
inaccessible to LEP populations in violation of Title VI.  See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 
C.F.R. 289 (2000) (reviewing Title VI requirements and requiring agencies to ensure they 
“provide meaningful access” to LEP individuals). 
 260. See supra Part I.B (describing how May could not understand  the customer service 
line, Website, or application materials); cf. Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (detailing how a court 
denied an LEP battered immigrant woman a restraining order because of procedural errors 
she made in filling out the paperwork). 
 261. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1503 (reviewing VAWA self-petitioning process and 
evidentiary requirements). 
 262. See FORM I-360, supra note 56, at Instructions 2 (delineating requirements for 
credible evidence determination). 
 263. See Immigration Petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(6)(ii) (2004) (mandating that USCIS 
can only make a prima facie petition determination if the applicant has fulfilled I-360 
requirements and provided supporting evidence). 
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specified items.264  Unfortunately, this fact is in a note separated from the 
list of requirements by two pages of instructions relating to non-applicable 
visa categories.265  Ultimately, such obfuscation frustrates the intent of 
VAWA to provide a means by which battered immigrant women can 
petition for immigration relief without having to involve their abusive 
spouse.266 
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that USCIS is in violation of 
Executive Order 13,166.  However, May’s options for enforcement of 
USCIS’s obligations are limited.267  She cannot sue under Title VI because 
a loophole allows federally-conducted agencies to be held to a lesser 
enforcement standard than federally-funded agencies.268  She can likely 
seek USCIS’s purely voluntary compliance through administrative 
remedies to enforce its Executive Order obligations, but it is unclear how 
successful this action would be.269  The next section explores whether May 
has an alternative cause of action:  to go to court and attempt to gain 
judicial enforcement under an equal protection claim, based on implied 
Title VI obligations.270 
B. USCIS’s Intent to Discriminate Against LEP Battered Immigrant 
Women Provides a Private Right of Action 
Recently, district courts have found a cause of action where a federally-
funded agency fails to address a known disparate impact.  The failure to 
remedy the burden may indicate intentional discrimination against a 
                                                          
 264. See FORM I-360, supra note 56, at Instructions 4 (allowing a self-petitioning 
battered spouse to “submit any relevant credible evidence in place of the suggested 
evidence”). 
 265. See id. (detailing required evidence and providing exception to credible evidence 
submission requirements). 
 266. See 146 CONG. REC. S10,192 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (listing VAWA II’s attempts 
to remove obstacles that hinder women from fleeing domestic violence and to reduce 
circumstances in which the abuser can threaten the women’s immigration status). 
 267. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (discussing a gap in enforcement 
where an administrative remedy is ineffectual, USCIS is not subject to Title VI, and courts 
will not enforce Executive Order 13,166). 
 268. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (describing how Title VI only 
covers federally-funded agencies and how administrative remedies are ineffectual). 
 269. See, e.g., Barbara Plantiko, Comment, Not-So-Equal Protection:  Securing 
Individuals of Limited English Proficiency with Meaningful Access to Medical Services, 32 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 239, 258 (2002) (arguing that administrative remedies are 
insufficient to “remedy denial of meaningful access” to LEP patients in health care settings). 
 270. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (noting that Title 
VI’s protection is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause); Elston v. Talladega 
County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 n.11 (11th Cir. 1993) (equating the analysis of 
intentional discrimination under Title VI to an equal protection analysis under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. 
Supp. 2d 486, 495-99 (D.N.J. 2003) (performing identical analyses for plaintiffs’ Title VI 
and equal protection claims); see also Plantiko, supra note 269, at 259-68 (demonstrating 
how a plaintiff could frame an equal protection argument using evidence of a Title VI 
violation). 
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protected class in violation of Section 601 and the Equal Protection 
Clause.271  These courts are possibly showing a philosophical allegiance 
with critics of the Supreme Court’s intent requirement who have argued 
that “[t]he burden on those who are subjugated is none the lighter because 
it is imposed inadvertently.”272  The following sections assert that USCIS’s 
lack of accommodation for LEP battered immigrant women like May rises 
to the level of intentional discrimination, and therefore justifies a private 
right of action against USCIS for violating the Equal Protection Clause. 
1. Case law 
An ongoing case in the District of New Jersey, South Camden Citizens in 
Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,273 straddles 
the Sandoval decision and provides a model for disparate impact and 
intentional discrimination analyses under both Title VI and the Equal 
Protection Clause.274  In South Camden, a citizen’s group alleged that 
discriminatory processes permitted the placement of a cement factory in a 
neighborhood where the residents were predominately of color.275  Prior to 
Sandoval, the South Camden court found that the citizen’s group had 
proved disparate impact discrimination by showing that, in violation of 
agency regulations, a facially-neutral procedure had a discriminatory effect 
on members of a group protected by Title VI.276  The court noted that this 
showing constituted rebuttable prima facie evidence of discrimination for 
                                                          
 271. See, e.g., S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 497 (finding knowledge of, and lack of 
action to prevent, disparate impact of factory placement as sufficient evidence of intent to 
discriminate in violation of Section 601 and the Equal Protection Clause); see also 
Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (acknowledging that 
plaintiffs stated a claim for intentional discrimination in violation of Section 601 based on a 
facially discriminatory policy).  At this time, neither case is final nor is there any way to 
predict whether or not an appellate court would agree with the district courts’ reasoning.  
See infra note 288 (describing how parties are filing cross claims in South Camden); infra 
note 292 (mentioning that the court certified a class of plaintiffs in Almendares). 
 272. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1519 (2d ed. 
1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s focus on intent does not comport with the “concept 
of equal justice under the law” inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment).  See generally 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning With 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
focus on intentional motivation to prove race discrimination fails to address the unconscious 
racism embedded within governmental actions). 
 273. 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001), modified, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001), 
rev’d, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 939 (2002), remanded to 254 F. 
Supp. 2d 486 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 274. See S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 495-99 (using the same analytical framework to 
evaluate plaintiffs’ Title VI and equal protection claims). 
 275. See S. Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (explaining that the permit process 
considered the technical emissions standards of factory placement, but not the racial 
implications of cumulative environmental burdens). 
 276. See id. at 484-95 (addressing the adverse impact, disparate impact, and injury 
causation of a factory in a minority neighborhood and determining it violated Section 602 
regulations). 
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which the factory had no substantially legitimate justification.277  The court 
therefore granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs.278 
After the Supreme Court ruled in Sandoval, the defendants submitted a 
motion to the New Jersey court asking it to vacate its earlier opinion, but 
the court declined to do so.279  The court reevaluated the South Camden 
facts in light of Sandoval’s restriction of judicial remedies for disparate 
impact claims.  The court determined that the plaintiffs could enforce 
Section 602 by invoking 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,280 which prohibits state 
actors from depriving persons of their legally-secured rights.281  However, 
on appeal, the Third Circuit held that an administrative regulation cannot 
create a right enforceable under Section 1983 unless the interest is implicit 
in the statute authorizing the regulation.282  Since Section 602 did not 
reveal any congressional intent to create a private right of action,283 the 
Third Circuit held that no agency regulations promulgated pursuant to 
Section 602 can provide that right.284  Thus, the Third Circuit foreclosed 
another avenue by which plaintiffs could assert a private right of action 
under Title VI against federally-funded programs that have a disparate 
impact on protected groups.285  Nevertheless, agencies still may prohibit 
actions that would have a disparate impact on protected groups by issuing 
regulations pursuant to Section 602.286  These regulations allow those 
                                                          
 277. See id. at 496-97 (concluding that compliance with Environmental Protection 
Agency guidelines did not establish that there was a substantial legitimate justification for 
the choice of site because the guidelines did not require consideration of Title VI non-
discrimination factors). 
 278. See id. at 452 (remanding the case to the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection for reevaluation of the factory’s permits). 
 279. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505, 
509 (D.N.J. 2001) (denying defendant’s motion because there were alternative legal grounds 
on which to base the preliminary injunction). 
 280. See id. at 518 (relying on Third Circuit precedent that allowed plaintiffs to bring 
Title VI disparate impact claims under Section 602 or under Section 1983).  Justice Stevens 
had suggested using Section 1983 as a course of action for Title VI disparate impact claims 
in his dissent in Sandoval.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 299-302 (2001) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that precedent indicates that Section 1983 provides a 
private right of action to enforce Title VI regulations against state actors). 
 281. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (granting a private right of action where a state actor 
violates a person’s civil rights). 
 282. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790 
(3d Cir. 2001) (remarking that the Section 602 regulations went beyond the congressional 
intent of simply defining the rights outlined in Section 601). 
 283. See id. at 789 (citing Sandoval’s conclusion that Section 602 demonstrates an intent 
only to place restrictions on enforcement, not to provide private rights for any class of 
protected individuals). 
 284. See id. (noting that Section 602 limits agencies to effectuating rights that Section 
601 had already created). 
 285. See id. at 774 (pointing out that Title VI proscribes only intentional discrimination, 
and, in light of Sandoval, the plaintiffs do not have a right of action). 
 286. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,458 
(declaring that Sandoval did not address the validity of agency regulations, promulgated 
under Title VI, Section 602, that prohibit disparate impact discrimination). 
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negatively affected to access an administrative remedy, even if they cannot 
prove intent and file suit.287 
On remand from the Third Circuit, the New Jersey district court revisited 
the South Camden facts for the third time, now examining it in the context 
of Title VI, Section 601 and the Equal Protection Clause.  The court noted 
that evidence of disparate impact alone is insufficient to meet the 
heightened evidentiary burden of intentional discrimination.288  However, 
the court recognized that disproportionate impact is often probative of 
intentional discrimination.289  Among factors indicative of intent, the court 
included:  historical background of the action, the foreseeability of the 
consequences of the action, the nature and magnitude of the disparity, and 
knowledge that the action would cause a disparate impact.290  The court 
used evidence of the agency’s knowledge of likely disparate health impact 
to allow a claim that the factory’s facially-neutral practices were 
intentionally discriminatory under Section 601 and the Equal Protection 
Clause.291  Thus, as some courts interpret the law today, plaintiffs such as 
May may be able to use evidence of disparate impact and of the 
defendant’s knowledge of a likely adverse impact to prove discriminatory 
intent.292 
                                                          
 287. See Victor Goode & Phyllis Flowers, Invisibility of Clients of Color:  The 
Intersection of Language, Culture, and Race in Legal Services Practice, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REV.:  J. OF POVERTY L. & POL’Y 109, 113-15 (2002) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks 
of pursuing an administrative solution rather than litigation for a language access complaint 
under Title VI); Plantiko, supra note 269, at 246 (describing the DOJ’s administrative 
enforcement procedures, which require an agency’s voluntary compliance to rectify its Title 
VI violations). 
 288. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 
495 (D.N.J. 2003) (stating that a party must allege “purposeful, invidious discrimination”).  
The South Camden case is ongoing and there has been a flurry of cross claims and counter 
claims in the last two years.  See, e.g., Order, S. Camden, (Jan. 12, 2004) (No. 01-cv-702) 
(dismissing multiple third-party complaints).  The Final Pretrial Conference is scheduled for 
June 2, 2005.  See Scheduling Order, S. Camden, (Nov. 30, 2004) (No. 01-702-FLW-AMD) 
(providing filing deadlines for plaintiffs and defendants). 
 289. See S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (quoting Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 563 
(3d Cir. 2002) for the proposition that “people usually intend the natural consequences of 
their actions”). 
 290. See id. at 496 (reviewing equal protection case law to determine relevant factors to 
prove intent). 
 291. See id. at 497 (considering agency’s knowledge of the factory’s likely disparate 
impacts on residents of color as a basis on which to state a claim of intentional 
discrimination). 
 292. See Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (denying 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and allowing plaintiffs’ Title VI right of action 
for intentional discrimination).  The plaintiffs in the case of Almendares, low-income LEP 
recipients of food stamps, argue that the Department of Job and Family Services 
discriminated against them and obstructed their rights to participate fully in the federal food 
stamp program by not providing materials in Spanish.  Id. at 800.  They argue that the 
agency’s administration of the program intentionally discriminated against them on the basis 
of national origin in violation of Title VI.  Id. at 801.  The district court acknowledged the 
limitations imposed by Sandoval, id. at 802, but found that the plaintiffs arguably stated a 
cause of action for intentional discrimination.  Id. at 804.  Notably, the court, drawing on the 
MORGAN.OFFTOPRINTER 8/9/2005  1:11:04 PM 
524 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:485 
2. USCIS intentionally discriminates against LEP battered immigrant
 women 
The text of VAWA clearly indicates congressional intent to provide 
immigration remedies for May and women similarly situated.293  Likewise, 
the text of Title VI clearly indicates congressional intent to eliminate 
discrimination based on national origin.294  Title VI itself applies only to 
federally-funded agencies;295 however, Executive Order 13,166 holds 
federally-conducted agencies to the same Title VI standards as the agencies 
they fund.296  Under Title VI jurisprudence, national origin discrimination 
encompasses discrimination on the basis of language.297  Thus, USCIS 
violates the spirit and plain language of Executive Order 13,166 (and 
associated implied Title VI obligations) where its failure to provide 
bilingual services discriminates against LEP applicants.298 
a. USCIS knowingly failed to comply with obligations imposed under
 Executive Order 13,166 
USCIS has known about its implied Title VI obligations, as clarified 
under Executive Order 13,166, for at least four years.299  USCIS’s standard 
                                                                                                                                      
reasoning of South Camden, acknowledged the plaintiffs’ claim that the long-term 
noncompliance of the agency with requirements for bilingual services, in violation of the 
Food Stamp Act and its regulations, could show intent to discriminate against LEP 
recipients.  Id. at 807.  The case is ongoing, and the court has certified the class of plaintiffs.  
See Order at 6, Almendares (July 16, 2004) (No. 3:00CV7524) (finding that plaintiffs met 
requirements as class representatives to seek equitable relief for alleged discrimination 
based on national origin in violation of Title VI).  The parties appear to be making efforts to 
reach a settlement agreement.  See Third Narrative Settlement Statement of Defendant Ohio 
Department of Job and Family Services at 1, Almendares (Feb. 1, 2005) (No. 
3:2000CV7524) (noting that Defendants are reviewing the settlement options); Plaintiffs’ 
Settlement Status Report at 2, Almendares (Feb. 1, 2005) (No. 3:00CV7524) (stating that 
Plaintiffs believe there is agreement on major issues). 
 293. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502 (defining VAWA’s purpose as to “offer 
protection against domestic violence” in light of findings that immigration laws acted as a 
barrier that kept battered immigrant women “locked in abusive relationships”). 
 294. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, § 601 
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground 
of . . . national origin  . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
 295. See id. (limiting the prohibition against discrimination to programs receiving 
“Federal financial assistance”). 
 296. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (specifying that federally-conducted 
agency language assistance plans “must be consistent with the standards applicable to 
recipients of federal financial assistance”). 
 297. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (including disparate impact based on 
provision of English-only services to Chinese-speaking students in regulations banning 
discrimination based on national origin); Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) 
(reviewing Title VI requirements and requiring agencies to ensure they provide “meaningful 
access” to LEP individuals). 
 298. See, e.g., Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003) 
(finding that failure to provide bilingual outreach services had a disparate impact on LEP 
Food Stamp applicants). 
 299. See Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121, 76,125 (Dep’t of Justice Dec. 6, 
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operating procedure denies May meaningful access to VAWA services and 
is in contradiction with Executive Order 13,166 and the DOJ Policy 
Guidance.300  A court could construe USCIS’s behavior to be indicative of 
intent to discriminate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.301  For 
example, USCIS’s willful failure to comply with implied Title VI 
mandates, and its denial of required meaningful access to its services for 
LEP individuals, is evidence of intent to discriminate.302  Thus far, USCIS 
has failed to issue even a plan listing its efforts to guarantee meaningful 
access to LEP applicants.303  An agency’s failure to share basic information 
about its programs with protected groups raises questions about its 
discriminatory intent.304  Such lack of attention is particularly suspect for a 
federally-conducted agency whose primary function is to work with 
immigrants and foreigners, a group likely to contain a high proportion of 
LEP individuals.305 
b. Disparate impact on LEP battered immigrant women is probative 
of USCIS’s discriminatory intent 
USCIS has a legal obligation to provide LEP battered immigrant women 
like May meaningful access to VAWA remedies.306  Its knowing non-
                                                                                                                                      
2000) (deferring comment on issues of language access issues because the INS planned to 
address them later “in compliance with Executive Order 13,116”). 
 300. Cf. Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (inferring agency’s discriminatory intent 
from its failure to implement bilingual programs required by Title VI and its implementing 
regulations). 
 301. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-
68 (1977) (noting that impact alone is not sufficient to prove an equal protection violation, 
and the court should also consider historical background and the administrative history of 
the action to establish intent). 
 302. See Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 804 (positing that long-standing noncompliance 
with a known law and implementing regulation shows intent to discriminate). 
 303. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., AGENCY SPECIFIC MATERIALS, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/agency.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (on file with the 
American University Law Review) (providing hyperlinks to published federal agency LEP 
plans and lacking a link to a DHS plan that would cover USCIS). 
 304. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1410 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(noting a school’s failure to notify minority parents of a school building project in a white 
neighborhood might indicate discriminatory intent in some circumstances). 
 305. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENTAL PLAN IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 
13,166 (Jan. 10, 2001) (noting that agencies that have “frequent, if not daily, contact with 
LEP individuals concerning matters of significant importance” must ensure that those 
served can access the services offered meaningfully), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/lep/dojimp.htm (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 306. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(b)(2) (noting that one purpose of VAWA is to 
protect immigrant women from domestic violence); Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title 
VI, § 602 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (authorizing agency regulations to prohibit 
discrimination that Section 601 does not cover specifically); Nondiscrimination in Federally 
Assisted Programs—Implementation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 C.F.R. 
§ 42.104(b) (Dep’t of Justice 2004) (prohibiting actions by DOJ agencies that adversely 
impact accomplishing program objectives with proscribed groups). 
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compliance gives rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.307  In 
South Camden, the New Jersey District Court required the plaintiffs to state 
a claim that the agency had implemented a facially-neutral policy 
“‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group.”308  However, the court rejected the agency’s argument 
that, even if it displayed indifference to potential negative consequences, 
there was no proof of intent to discriminate,309  and accepted the plaintiffs’ 
claims that the agency actions demonstrated discriminatory animus.310  The 
court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ allegations that the placement of the 
factory had a disparate impact on residents of color were both relevant and 
probative of the defendant’s discriminatory motive.311 
Similarly, under its current mode of operation, USCIS denies May and 
other LEP battered immigrant women a meaningful opportunity to access 
VAWA information312 and to apply for immigration benefits.313  USCIS’s 
implied Title VI obligations are clear,314 yet it has failed to act upon those 
obligations.  USCIS’s indifference and avoidance of its Executive Order 
responsibilities allow an inference that it intended to discriminate against 
LEP applicants.315  In addition, USCIS’s current policies endorse the 
pervasive lack of multilingual services offered to prospective VAWA 
applicants and fail to ensure meaningful access to services for May or any 
                                                          
 307. See Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 807 (finding non-compliance with known laws 
requiring LEP accessibility as indicating intent to discriminate in violation of Section 601). 
 308. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 
495 (D.N.J. 2003) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)) 
(recognizing that Section 601 and equal protection claims require “purposeful, invidious 
discrimination” against the plaintiff). 
 309. See id. at 496-97 (noting that the burden shifts to the defendant to refute the 
allegations once the plaintiffs have established discriminatory intent). 
 310. See id. at 496 (observing that the court could infer discriminatory intent from 
historical background, departures from usual procedure, and foreseeable negative 
consequences). 
 311. See id. at 497 (noting that a defendant’s knowledge of disparate impact, historical 
practices, and situational specifics is sufficient to state a cause of action under Section 601). 
 312. See supra Part I.B.1 (describing linguistic barriers to accessing basic VAWA 
information). 
 313. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing linguistic barriers to applying for VAWA benefits). 
 314. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, § 601 
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national 
origin); Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (requiring federally-conducted 
agencies to provide LEP individuals with equivalent services to those provided to English 
speakers); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, at ch. 6 (requiring that internal federal 
language assistance plans be consistent with standards applicable to recipients of federal 
funding). 
 315. See Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (positing 
that long-term noncompliance with requirements for LEP services, in violation of known 
legal obligations, could show intent to discriminate).  The government’s history of 
discriminatory administration of immigration benefits strengthens the inference of intent in 
this case.  See sources cited supra note 18 (discussing past immigration policies that had a 
discriminatory effect on women and people of color). 
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battered immigrant woman who does not speak English.316  In the case of 
USCIS, an agency with extensive contact with LEP populations, where the 
result of lack of language access is as severe as deportation or severe 
injury, such lack of attention to language barriers rises to the level of 
“invidious discrimination on the basis of national origin and race.”317  
Thus, USCIS’s failure to serve those disadvantaged on account of national 
origin indicates its unlawful discriminatory intent.318 
Under a South Camden analysis, USCIS’s facially-neutral evidence 
procedure disproportionately affects May because it fails to consider the 
particulars of her situation.319  In South Camden, the New Jersey District 
Court noted that race-neutral permitting procedures resulted in 
discriminatory placement of factories in residential communities of 
color.320  A new factory would affect the residents’ health, which, when 
added to the cumulative effects of other community-specific environmental 
factors, constituted an adverse impact.321  The court concluded that the 
factory’s placement had a disparate impact in violation of Title VI because 
statistical evidence showed that companies frequently placed new factories 
in areas where the residents were largely of color.322  Thus, the district 
court used a “totality of the circumstances”323 test that took into 
consideration community-specific harms.324 
Similarly, the totality of May’s circumstances illustrates that USCIS’s 
                                                          
 316. Cf. Louise Chu, Rise in Immigrant Domestic Abuse Cases Reflects Better Outreach, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 16, 2003 (reporting that a thirty percent increase in LEP 
domestic violence cases resulted from improved outreach to immigrant populations), 
available at http://www.charlotte.com/mid/observer/news/local/ 5881323.htm. 
 317. See Enforcement of Title VI, supra note 92, at 50,123-24 (noting that xenophobic 
prejudice may trigger language discrimination). 
 318. See, e.g., Connie Paige, Out of China:  A Woman’s Story Lifts Veil on Once-Taboo 
Topic, BOSTON GLOBE (City Weekly), Nov. 16, 2003, at 1 (reporting on cuts in immigrant 
domestic violence services and quoting sources who feel that “government programs should 
do more to respond to” the deficient supply of immigrant services). 
 319. Cf. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 
483 (D.N.J. 2001) (finding that a facially-neutral permit procedure disproportionately 
affected citizens of color because it failed to consider the particulars of their situation). 
 320. See id. at 484 (acknowledging that the defendants followed government guidelines 
in determining the location of the factories at issue). 
 321. See id. at 490 (requiring defendants to consider external sources of pollution to 
determine whether or not the placement of a new factory would have an adverse impact on 
the community). 
 322. See id. at 492-93 (“[I]n the State of New Jersey there is ‘a strong, highly statistically 
significant, and disturbing pattern of association between the racial and ethnic composition 
of communities, the number of [Environmental Protection Agency] regulated facilities, and 
the number of facilities with Air Permits[.]’”). 
 323. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (describing how 
discriminatory purpose can be inferred from “the totality of the relevant facts,” such as 
where an action has a more severe impact on one group than another). 
 324. See S. Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (considering specific health problems within 
the community, the environmental problems of the neighborhood, and the number of 
existing industries that impose an environmental burden when assessing Title VI 
compliance). 
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actions discriminate against LEP battered immigrant women.325  While the 
English-language evidentiary requirement theoretically applies to all 
applicants for USCIS benefits,326 in practice it has an unlawful 
discriminatory impact on those who are LEP as a result of national 
origin.327  USCIS fails to consider that it is primarily LEP individuals who 
will have documents needing translation, that translation imposes a 
logistical and financial burden on LEP individuals, and that this 
requirement may pose a barrier to assertion of a VAWA claim.328  Thus, in 
light of the clear violation of the Executive Order and invidious intent to 
discriminate, May is hoping that a judge will enforce USCIS’s obligations 
to her. 
C. Lack of Judicial Enforcement of “Meaningful Access” 
Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause329 have much in common.330  
Both are tools of anti-discrimination, introduced in response to an urgent 
need to eliminate pervasive racial discrimination.331  Both protect 
individuals from arbitrary government discrimination on the basis of 
national origin.332  Key cases for both have involved discrimination in the 
educational context.333  The Supreme Court has found both claims to 
                                                          
 325. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text (describing the disparate impact of 
USCIS’s facially neutral procedures). 
 326. See Immigration Court—Rules of Procedure, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.33 (2004) (requiring 
that all applicants who submit any foreign language document to USCIS shall also send a 
certified English translation). 
 327. Cf. S. Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 483 (finding that a facially-neutral permit 
procedure disproportionately affected citizens of color because it failed to consider the 
particulars of their situation). 
 328. Cf. id. at 451 (noting that the factory failed to consider issues such as existing 
emissions levels and the poor health of the community and finding these omissions provided 
evidence of disparate impact discrimination). 
 329. The Supreme Court has applied Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees 
to federal government actions via the Fifth Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
(barring a state from denying “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws”); id. amend. V (providing for due process to prevent arbitrary deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (extending equal 
protection guarantees to federal acts because discrimination constitutes a deprivation of 
liberty under the Fifth Amendment). 
 330. See John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implications for 
Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1641 (2002) (arguing that the 
structural schemes of Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment are indistinguishable). 
 331. Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (stating that the “central 
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause . . . is the prevention of official conduct 
discriminating on the basis of race”), with President John F. Kennedy, Address to Congress 
(Feb. 28, 1963) (noting that Title VI was needed because prior legislative and constitutional 
attempts had not ended racial discrimination), available at 
http://www.congresslink.org/civil/cr1.html. 
 332. Compare Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (finding equal protection 
applied to Chinese citizens who were “within the territorial jurisdiction” of the United 
States), with Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, § 601 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d) (barring discrimination on the basis of “race, color, or national origin”). 
 333. Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially-
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require proof of intentional discrimination334 and that the means by which a 
plaintiff can prove a violation of either is functionally identical.335  Courts 
employ a “burden shifting” mode of analysis for both claims prior to 
striking down the challenged action.336  Both have been extended to cover 
the federal government’s own activities in recognition that the federal 
government should not be allowed to discriminate in a manner prohibited 
to others.337 
However, one key difference between the two analyses is how courts 
have regarded the interconnection of national origin and language.338  The 
Supreme Court has established that LEP status is a component of national 
origin under Title VI.339  The Supreme Court, though, has declined to reach 
the issue in its equal protection jurisprudence.340  In equal protection 
analyses, courts “apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of 
                                                                                                                                      
segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause), with Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 
(1974) (finding that English-only school programs violated Title VI). 
 334. Compare Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (observing that disproportionate impact does not 
prove a law violates the Equal Protection Clause in the absence of a discriminatory 
purpose), with Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (restricting plaintiffs to a 
cause of action proving intentional discrimination in violation of Section 601 and 
eliminating any right of action to enforce disparate impact discrimination under Section 
602). 
 335. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (noting that Title 
VI’s protection is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause); Elston v. Talladega 
County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 n.11 (11th Cir. 1993) (equating the analysis of 
intentional discrimination under Title VI to an equal protection analysis under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. 
Supp. 2d 486, 493-99 (D.N.J. 2003) (considering plaintiffs’ Title VI and equal protection 
claims together).  Compare Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 267-68 (1977) (discussing evidentiary sources such as legislative history that can help 
prove discriminatory intent in equal protection claims), with S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 
496 (requiring similar evidentiary sources for a Title VI claim to those noted in Arlington 
Heights). 
 336. Compare Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 566 n.21 (stating that once plaintiffs have 
made a threshold showing of discriminatory intent, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
show that the same decision would have resulted even had it not considered the 
impermissible purpose), with S. Camden, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (employing the Arlington 
Heights burden-shifting test as part of a Title VI analysis). 
 337. Compare Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (finding that equal protection 
applies to federal actions by way of the Fifth Amendment because “discrimination may be 
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process”), with Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 
289, § 1 (2000) (noting that the federal government has an obligation to ensure accessibility 
for LEP individuals to its own services, as well as those of its funded programs previously 
covered by Title VI). 
 338. See generally Plantiko, supra note 269 (making Title VI and equal protection 
arguments on behalf of LEP patients seeking interpretation services at federally-funded 
hospitals). 
 339. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (finding English-only educational 
programs for Chinese-speaking students was a form of national origin discrimination under 
Title VI). 
 340. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (declining to decide 
whether striking a prospective juror on the basis of Spanish language ability was a pretext 
for ethnic discrimination). 
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classifications.”341  Courts designate certain groups as “discrete and insular 
minorities”342 based on their racial or national origin status and apply strict 
scrutiny when examining acts that discriminate against them.343  Courts 
afford other classifications, such as gender or economic status, either 
intermediate scrutiny344 or rational basis scrutiny.345  The degree of scrutiny 
that a court would apply to May’s claim remains unclear.346  Lower courts’ 
equal protection analyses have generally refused to recognize the 
intertwined relationship of language and national origin and have applied 
rational basis scrutiny to such claims.347  The lack of agreement on the 
interconnection of language and national origin discrimination insulates 
agencies like USCIS from a judicially-enforceable legal obligation to 
provide meaningful access to battered immigrant women like May outside 
of a due process analysis.348 
Once May has stated a cause of action against USCIS for intentionally 
discriminating against her, the burden shifts to USCIS to provide a 
rationale for its discriminatory actions.349  USCIS is likely to advance the 
same cost and administrative rationales as it would under the third prong of 
the Fifth Amendment due process test established in Mathews.350  In both a 
                                                          
 341. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (discussing situations under which 
courts require increased judicial scrutiny). 
 342. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4  (1938). 
 343. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (noting that classifications 
drawn on the basis of race could only be upheld if “necessary to the accomplishment of 
some permissible [government] objective”). 
 344. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (striking down gender-based 
polices unless they “serve important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related 
to achievement of those objectives”). 
 345. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (upholding the 
constitutionality of discriminatory economic policies that were rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose). 
 346. See Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 305 (1992) (noting that “language use 
by minority language groups has not yet been situated within the framework of legal 
standards which control the application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment”); id. at 304-10 (discussing situations in which strict, intermediate, or rational 
basis scrutiny might apply to language minorities). 
 347. See, e.g., Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 801 (9th Cir. 1985) (reviewing past 
precedent and determining that “a language-based classification is not the equivalent of a 
national origin classification, and does not denote a suspect class”). 
 348. Compare Justin B. Denton, Comment, Protecting Both Ethnic Minorities and the 
Equal Protection Clause:  The Dilemma of Language-Based Peremptory Challenges, 1997 
BYU L. REV. 101, 120-23 (arguing that courts should not extend strict scrutiny based on 
language because language minorities do not have a history of discrimination and language 
classifications are relevant to state interests), with Juan F. Perea, Buscando America:  Why 
Integration and Equal Protection Fail To Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1426-
38 (2004) (describing how equal protection jurisprudence ignores the intertwined nature of 
discrimination on the basis of language and race for Latinos/Latinas). 
 349. See, e.g., S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 
2d 486, 496 (D.N.J. 2003) (shifting the burden to the factory to show that the same decision 
would have resulted in the absence of a discriminatory animus after the citizens group had 
proved intent). 
 350. See supra Part II.C.1 (applying the Mathews three-prong test to assess May’s due 
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due process and equal protection context, USCIS’s justifications are 
unavailing.  Under a strict scrutiny equal protection analysis, USCIS’s 
justifications are likely insufficient to show that its current administration 
of VAWA is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.351  
However, the Supreme Court has only established a direct correlation of 
nationality and language in its Title VI jurisprudence, not in the equal 
protection context.352  Thus, courts may review May’s claim under a less 
than strict scrutiny standard, possibly even under the rational basis 
standard, which would make it easier for USCIS to prevail over a challenge 
to its practices.353 
Under a rational basis standard, the policy need only rationally relate to a 
legitimate government purpose in order to withstand legal challenge.354  
Courts frequently defer to policies that could be associated with the federal 
government’s plenary powers over immigration.355  However, Congress has 
clearly spoken about providing battered immigrant women with an 
immigration remedy in VAWA,356 and the language policies at issue do not 
implicate May’s eligibility to stay in the United States.357  The failure of 
                                                                                                                                      
process right to adequate notice of VAWA remedies). 
 351. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 496 (1954) (finding that a policy of 
segregating schools failed to meet strict scrutiny because there was no compelling state 
reason for racial discrimination). 
 352. Compare Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (affirming the prohibition of 
language discrimination as a form of national origin discrimination under Title VI), with 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (declining to decide whether striking a 
prospective juror on the basis of Spanish language ability was a pretext for racial 
discrimination subject to strict scrutiny).  The Supreme Court seems to struggle with how to 
compare language minorities with other protected groups instead of reviewing the history of 
discrimination and unequal treatment of LEP individuals on its own merits.  See, e.g., 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (“It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some 
communities, that proficiency in a certain language, like skin color, should be treated as a 
surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.”). 
 353. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.1, 
at 645-46 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that the burden of proof rests with the challenger under 
rational basis review, and that courts strike down few laws under this “enormously 
deferential” standard). 
 354. Compare Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 (1979) (upholding a citizenship 
requirement for public school teachers as rationally-related to state interests in promoting 
civic virtues), with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding a state provision 
denying protection on the basis of sexual orientation unconstitutional under a rational basis 
standard). 
 355. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (upholding denial of 
Medicare benefits to certain non-citizens in recognition of Congress’s ability to make 
different rules for citizens and non-citizens under its “broad power over naturalization and 
immigration”).  See generally Michele E. Kenney, A Pitfall of Judicial Deference:  Equal 
Protection of the Laws Fails Women in Lewis v. Thompson, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 525 
(discussing how deference to Congress’s plenary powers negates equal protection 
guarantees for non-citizens). 
 356. See VAWA II, supra note 2, Title V, §§ 1503-1504 (providing self-petitioning and 
cancellation of removal immigration remedies for battered immigrant women). 
 357. See, e.g., id. § 1503(b)(1) (describing an eligible woman as one who was married in 
good faith and was battered, but not specifying that she must speak English to qualify). 
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USCIS to follow the Executive Order and the DOJ Guidance eviscerates 
this congressional intent by excluding thousands of potentially eligible 
women from remedies because they do not speak English.358  A court could 
see any cost or administrative justification for USCIS’s failure to 
implement congressional policy,359 or even to comply with simple 
recordkeeping tasks to determine the extent of the problem,360 as a pretext 
for discriminatory actions.361  However, because of the lack of clarity 
regarding the level of scrutiny the court would employ, it is unclear 
whether May would be successful in attempting to judicially enforce 
USCIS’s obligations, even with persuasive evidence that USCIS’s English-
only administration of VAWA is contrary to the intent of Executive Order 
13,166 and has a discriminatory impact on her. 
The Equal Protection Clause court decisions are inconsistent with the 
plain language of Executive Order 13,166, which recognizes the need to 
extend protection to language minorities because LEP status results from 
national origin.362  The federal government has publicized the assumed 
correlation in a “Know Your Rights” brochure for LEP individuals which 
states:  “Sometimes, when a government agency or an organization does 
not help you because you are LEP, they violate the law.  This is called 
National Origin Discrimination.”363  Thus, the intent of the Executive Order 
and the federal government is to extend protection to LEP individuals, 
regardless of who provides the services.364  It is reasonable to assume that 
the government expects federally-conducted agencies such as USCIS to 
follow the requirements of the Executive Order,365 and it is similarly 
reasonable to assume that May should have a means by which to enforce 
such protections.366 
                                                          
 358. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (describing how USCIS processes 
6,000 VAWA claims per year, whereas 75,000 women are likely eligible). 
 359. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (rejecting arguments about possible 
cost impacts of translation as part of a due process analysis). 
 360. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 183, at 43 (commenting that INS does not maintain 
documentation on the language requirements of the people it serves). 
 361. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (requiring federal agencies to 
provide LEP individuals with equivalent services to those provided to English speakers); 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 80, ch. 6 (clarifying that while Title VI itself only covers 
funded agencies, federally-conducted agencies are held to the same standards). 
 362. See Exec. Order No. 13,166 (requiring improved access “for persons, who, as a 
result of national origin, are limited in their English proficiency”). 
 363. See FED. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY, supra 
note 150 (describing possible violations of Title VI for LEP beneficiaries). 
 364. See Exec. Order No. 13,166, §§ 2-3 (applying similar obligations toward LEP 
individuals on federally-conducted agencies as Title VI imposes on federally-funded 
agencies). 
 365. See Ostrow, supra note 107, at 660 (noting that Executive Orders have the force and 
effect of law). 
 366. See, e.g., id. at 687-88 (arguing that courts should enforce Executive Orders 
because of the growing importance of “presidential legislation”). 
MORGAN.OFFTOPRINTER 8/9/2005  1:11:04 PM 
2004] ACCESS DENIED 533 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current funding for VAWA expires in 2005.367  Congressional intent 
was to provide immigration relief to immigrant women like May who were 
battered by LPR or USC husbands.368  As Congress drafts the 
reauthorization, it should consider closing the loophole that enables USCIS 
to avoid judicial enforcement of its obligations to provide LEP services to 
battered immigrant women.369  For example, Congress could insert 
language similar to that of Executive Order 13,166 into the BIWPA section 
of VAWA and require USCIS to administer the program in a manner that 
ensures it is accessible to all VAWA-eligible women, irrespective of 
language.370  Alternatively, Congress could earmark funds to provide 
linguistically-tailored services to enable the intended beneficiaries to access 
the benefits it granted.371  Some domestic violence agencies are accessing 
VAWA funding to enable provision of LEP services already,372 and federal 
line-item funding would likely encourage other organizations, government 
and non-profit, to improve LEP services.373  Depending on which agency 
VAWA authorizes to distribute the funds, this may also have the interesting 
side-effect of making USCIS a “federally-funded” agency directly subject 
to Title VI and its associated cause of action.374 
Even in the absence of line-item funding, USCIS has a legal and ethical 
obligation to ensure that May, and LEP battered immigrant women 
                                                          
 367. See VAWA II, supra note 2 (reauthorizing VAWA funding until 2005). 
 368. See supra Part I.A (enunciating one purpose of VAWA I and VAWA II as enabling 
women to leave abusive relationships without fear of immigration consequences). 
 369. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (noting that there are limited ways 
in which May can assert a cause of action against a federally-conducted agency for failing to 
provide LEP services).  A more permanent option would be for Congress to amend Title VI 
to expand its coverage to both federally-funded and federally-conducted programs.  Cf. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)) (extending prohibitions on racial 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to federal employers after 
Executive Orders forbidding discrimination had proved ineffective). 
 370. Cf. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (noting that “each Federal agency 
shall examine the services it provides and develop and implement a system by which LEP 
persons can meaningfully access those services consistent with, and without unduly 
burdening, the fundamental mission of the agency”). 
 371. Cf. VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1512 (providing line-item grants to provide battered 
immigrants with access to services and legal representation for VAWA law enforcement and 
prosecution, and rural and campus outreach programs). 
 372. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 755(e) (West 2004) (noting that funding for LEP 
services for hearings related to domestic violence comes from state agencies’ VAWA 
funding). 
 373. See Paul M. Uyehara, Making Legal Services Accessible to Limited English 
Proficient Clients, 17 MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J., Spring 2003, at 33, 37 (noting costs of 
$1,500 per month to provide language services at a legal clinic in Philadelphia), available at 
http://www.lri.lsc.gov/pdf/03/030063_uyeharamie.pdf. 
 374. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, Title VI, § 601 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d) (barring agencies receiving federal funding from discriminating on the basis of 
national origin). 
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generally, can access VAWA immigration benefits.375  This obligation to 
comply with Title VI mandates (implied through Executive Order 13,166) 
is stronger in the wake of Sandoval.376  The DOJ has articulated, in 
considerable detail, the steps needed to solve USCIS’s most obvious 
violations of Executive Order 13,166.377  For example, USCIS should 
reengineer its Website to contain easily-accessible information in multiple 
languages on VAWA, application procedures, and the Hotline.378  At the 
very least, USCIS should enable one-click translation of all Website 
content, providing a direct link to a machine translation Website to provide 
instant translation of the page.379  It should direct prospective VAWA 
applicants’ inquiries to a special customer service line and ensure that it has 
multilingual capabilities (for example, pre-recorded translated messages 
and effective access to telephone interpretation).380  USCIS should create 
and distribute informational material on VAWA remedies written in plain 
English and translated into the languages spoken by eligible populations, in 
order to educate potential applicants.381  USCIS should also simplify the 
English version of Form I-360 and translate it into the languages most 
commonly spoken by foreign-born spouses.382  And, USCIS should provide 
translation of evidentiary submissions for women who have a financial 
                                                          
 375. See Uyehara, supra note 373, at 37 (comparing using the absence of funding as an 
excuse for not providing equal services to LEP clients to feeling comfortable with private 
clubs restricted to white men). 
 376. See Note, supra note 212, at 1796-97 (advocating stronger administrative remedies 
for disparate impact discrimination to replace diminishing rights for private enforcement of 
Title VI). 
 377. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,455-
56 (providing evaluations of implementation procedures, including suggestions for 
enhanced “recipient language assistance,” the use of “informal interpreters,” and “written 
translation safe harbors”). 
 378. See, e.g., MID-VALLEY WOMEN’S CRISIS SERVICE, WELCOME (Mar. 2003), at http: 
//www.mvwcs.com/ (providing professionally-translated information on domestic violence 
services in English, Spanish, Russian, and Vietnamese from the agency’s homepage) (on 
file with the American University Law Review). 
 379. Compare WASH. METRO. AREA TRANSIT AUTH., at http://www.wmata.com (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (providing 
information easily accessible to LEP customers by using clickable “flags” that trigger 
automatic translations of text on the page), with TRANSLATION, supra note 46 (presenting 
discriminatory barriers to accessing information by requiring users to read English 
instructions, surf to another site, manually copy and paste text, and select source and target 
languages from a list written in English). 
 380. Compare supra note 50 and accompanying text (describing how the National 
Domestic Violence Hotline can access 139 languages), with supra note 42 and 
accompanying text (noting that the USCIS customer service line is available only in English 
and Spanish). 
 381. See, e.g., Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call 
for Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 86 (2003) (recommending that 
community organizations and the police develop multilingual outreach materials to inform 
battered immigrant women of resources). 
 382. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,463 
(recommending that an agency translate vital documents into the languages spoken by the 
LEP groups with whom the agency has the most contact). 
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need and are otherwise unable to obtain translation of materials.383 
Finally, USCIS should undertake a public information campaign in 
cooperation with community organizations to ensure that all foreign-born 
spouses are aware that domestic violence is a crime and that USCIS 
provides immigration relief for victims of that crime.384  This may involve 
culturally-tailored community outreach (for example, posters in grocery 
stores or flyers in churches) and a rethinking of immigration processes to 
ensure that USCIS notifies women individually of their options, in a 
language they can understand.385  This notification would serve two goals:  
(1) to notify LEP battered immigrant women of VAWA remedies, and (2) 
to expand enforcement beyond purely remedial assistance to LEP battered 
immigrant women and improve awareness of the law, a goal that is more in 
line with the overall preventive intent of VAWA.386 
CONCLUSION 
Title VI has been the law for over forty years.387  Congress passed 
VAWA eleven years ago.388  Executive Order 13,166 and the DOJ Policy 
Guidance have been in effect for almost five years.389  Yet, in violation of 
these authorities, USCIS has failed to provide the most basic language 
accommodations to one of the most vulnerable populations it serves:  LEP 
battered immigrant women asserting VAWA claims.  By taking advantage 
                                                          
 383. Cf. Lee, supra note 35, at 179 (reporting that an LEP battered immigrant woman 
abandoned her efforts to apply for assistance because she had no friends able to translate for 
her). 
 384. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,465 
(emphasizing the importance of letting LEP persons know, in a language they understand, 
that language assistance is available to help them access the services).  There is precedent 
for a government-mandated multilingual public awareness campaign for VAWA remedies.  
See Mail-Order Bride Business, 8 U.S.C. § 1375(b)(1) (2000) (requiring international 
matchmaking organizations to provide immigration information “in the recruit’s native 
language,” including details of VAWA remedies for battered women).  Such mandates 
provide a civil cause of action for victims.  See, e.g., Fox v. Encounters Int’l, 318 F. Supp. 
2d 279, 296 (D. Md. 2002) (denying a motion to dismiss in favor of a Ukrainian woman 
beaten by her USC husband after the matchmaking organization negligently failed to inform 
her of her VAWA legal rights). 
 385. See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients, supra note 98, at 41,465 
(suggesting working with stakeholders, placing notices in community newspapers, and 
advertising on non-English language radio stations to publicize resources available to 
battered immigrant women). 
 386. See ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DOMESTIC SOC. POLICY DIV., 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT:  HISTORY, FEDERAL FUNDING, AND REAUTHORIZING 
LEGISLATION 1 (Oct. 12, 2001) (summarizing VAWA’s aims as “enforcement as well as 
educational and social programs to prevent crime”), available at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/women/violence/reports.htm. 
 387. See supra note 74 (noting that the Act became law in 1964). 
 388. See VAWA I, supra note 1 (expanding federal funding of violence against women 
services starting in 1994). 
 389. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (detailing how the DOJ documents 
clarified an agency’s Title VI obligations to LEP individuals under Executive Order 
13,166). 
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of a loophole in enforcement, USCIS has inverted the historical model 
where federal agencies were leaders in encouraging others to adopt non-
discriminatory policies390 and is holding itself to a lower standard than it 
would legally hold agencies to which it provides funds.391  USCIS should 
fix its current lack of LEP-accessibility to comply with congressional intent 
and ensure VAWA’s success,392 but more importantly, to enable scores of 
LEP battered immigrant women to escape continued violence at the hands 
of their USC and LPR husbands. 
                                                          
 390. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d) (1964) (implementing federal measures to reduce the states’ ability to 
discriminate on the basis of race). 
 391. Compare Title VI, §§ 601-602, 78 Stat. at 252 (providing a private cause of action 
against federally-funded agencies that violate its non-discrimination provisions), with Exec. 
Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000) (providing no enforceable right of action against 
federally-conducted agencies for violations). 
 392. See VAWA II, supra note 2, § 1502(b)(2) (detailing one of VAWA’s purposes as 
providing protection against domestic violence). 
